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ABSTRACT
PRAGYA SINGH : The Impact of Imperfect Information on the Health Insurance Choice, Health
Outcomes and Medical Expenditures of the Elderly
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie)
Traditional choice models assume that individuals have full information about the set of avail-
able products and their characteristics. However, recent empirical studies illustrate the importance
of limited information about product availability and characteristics in consumer decision making.
The market for health insurance is an important market in which the inherent product complexity
frequently leads to incomplete consideration or attention to plan alternatives and their features.
This research investigates the dynamic impact of limited information about the insurance alter-
natives available through Medicare on the expenditures and health outcomes of the elderly, using
the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) dataset, which reports individuals’ knowledge
about insurance plan characteristics as well as their choice of plan. Simulations from parameter
estimates obtained through joint estimation of demand equations show that more informed indi-
viduals are more likely to supplement traditional fee-for-service Medicare with Prescription Drug
coverage and other supplemental insurance policies and, in spite of consuming more medical care,
realize lower out-of-pocket expenditures. Increasing the value of the information measure used
in this study by one standard deviation, produces a 30 dollar decrease in out-of-pocket expendi-
tures per beneficiary. However, the total medical care expenditure for each Medicare beneficiary
increases by 432 dollars. This net increase in spending of 402 dollars per beneficiary has to be
weighed against a positive impact on health status of elderly persons with functional limitations.
The probability of such individuals transitioning into a ‘no functional limitation’ state increases
by 2 per cent with the increase in information. Furthermore, with limited resources available to
iii
expand insurance literacy, policymakers should target the elderly in lower health status for they
realize lower out-of-pocket expenditures as well as an improvement in their health outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Frankie Huff is working on her doctoral degree in Florida and can tackle the most complicated
education theories with ease. That’s not the case when it comes to picking a health insurance plan
through her school. “It is daunting–at times more difficult to interpret than the scholarly research
I pore through for my own dissertation,”she says.
This excerpt from CNN Health illustrates the challenge that millions of Americans face every
open enrollment season − understanding their health insurance coverage options, comparing them
on various dimensions, and making an optimal choice. Recent survey data (Handel and Kolstad,
2013) and empirical research (Bhargava et al., 2015; Lin and Wildenbeest, 2013) show that there
are considerable information frictions in the market for health insurance; consumers often do not
consider all the options available to them, fail to give attention to individualized plan characteris-
tics, and consequently,do not select the best option.
These aspects of consumer behavior may be explained in terms of costs of acquiring informa-
tion, where costs are defined very broadly and include pecuniary costs of acquiring information
such as access to a personal computer or internet, time costs or cognitive costs of processing infor-
mation. As a consequence of these information constraints, consumers frequently end up having
incomplete and incorrect information about coverage options and plan features.1
Individuals with limited information on insurance alternatives and the characteristics of those
1Data from the 2009 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (used in this study) indicate alarmingly low levels of
information among Medicare beneficiaries about the options available to them. For instance, 35 per cent of respondents
reported not being sure if there are any coverage options available with Medicare and nearly half of all respondents
incorrectly believe that out-of-pocket costs are the same for all Prescription Drug Plans available through Part D of
Medicare.
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alternatives may be making suboptimal plan choices, not getting the coverage that they need, get-
ting it at higher costs, or potentially over insuring themselves. Since subsequent medical care
utilization depends on the marginal effective prices2 of medical care induced by the chosen plan
and medical care inputs improve, maintain or reduce deterioration of health, limited information
indirectly affects health outcomes. For instance, use of preventive care services, (e.g., mammo-
gram, prostate and cancer screenings) can lead to early detection of health conditions, thus slowing
or reversing deterioration of untreated health in the future. Uncertainty about the coverage of these
services3 is likely to impact utilization of these services, thus affecting long term individual health.
Grossman (1972) initiated the conceptualization of health as a capital good (i.e., it lasts, may
depreciate, and can be augmented through investment). Thus, the effects of imperfect information
today may have implications for future health outcomes; that is, limited information has dynamic
(and long-run) consequences, rather than simply static (short-run) ones.
The level of information possessed by an individual is not randomly distributed. Many ob-
served and unobserved characteristics of the individual (e.g., education, health status, risk aversion)
and her community (e.g., internet access, public libraries, information campaigns) determine how
much information she seeks and how well that information is processed. Hence, there may be se-
lection into obtaining more information. The causal impact of imperfect information on individual
choices and outcomes cannot be measured without taking into account this potential endogeneity.
The broad objective of this research is to examine the dynamic causal impacts of limited infor-
mation on the choices of insurance and medical care consumption, medical care expenditures and
health outcomes of the elderly. To this end, the paper exploits some unique features of the Medi-
care Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) conducted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) to identify the extent of information possessed by the beneficiaries. The MCBS is
a longitudinal survey of Medicare beneficiaries that is linked to Medicare claims data and provides
2Marginal effective prices are determined by features such as deductible, coinsurance and out-of-pocket maximum
of the plan.
3A quarter of female respondents in the 2009 MCBS are not aware that Medicare covers an annual mammogram.
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a complete picture of the utilization and expenditures of the beneficiaries as well as their health
conditions and insurance choices each period. One component of the survey data files is the Ben-
eficiary Needs and Knowledge Supplement, which is designed as a quiz testing the knowledge of
beneficiaries on various aspects of coverage alternatives and the services covered under Medicare.
In this research, the number of correct responses to these questions provided by the beneficiary is
used as a measure of her information.
The impact of information is analyzed in the context of a dynamic decision making model
in which agents make sequential decisions about information seeking, insurance selection, and
preventive and curative medical care consumption. The theoretical framework of the model is used
to derive specifications of the demand equations for individual choices and stochastic evolution of
medical expenditures and health outcomes. These dynamic equations are estimated jointly along
with the distributions of unobserved heterogeneity that allow for correlation across equations and
over time using maximum likelihood estimation. Theoretically-relevant exogenous variables are
used as exclusion restrictions for identification, which is also aided by the use of panel data and
functional form restrictions in the estimation equations.
Parameter estimates from the model reveal that imperfect information is significant in explain-
ing health insurance choices and medical care use and expenditures. Better informed individu-
als are more likely to choose Medicare Advantage plans or supplement the fee-for-service (FFS)
Medicare with Part D coverage and other supplemental insurance policies such as Medigap. The
average utilization of preventive care services, outpatient care, and prescription drugs increases
with information leading to higher total expenditures. Out-of-pocket expenditures, however, de-
cline with greater information. Using the parameter estimates, simulation of individual choices and
outcomes under the scenario when all individuals have full information (i.e., answer all questions
correctly) versus when they have no information shows an 8.5 per cent decline in out-of-pocket
expenditures. The probability of continuing to be in lower health status (measured by functional
limitations) declines by approximately 11 per cent with greater information. The effect of having
a personal computer at home and receiving the ‘Medicare and You’ book (which provides details
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on insurance choices) has a positive significant impact on information, and policies that provide
greater access to such resources are predicted to increase average information in the population.
Survey data on how consumers make insurance choices or how well informed they are while
selecting insurance are not commonly available.4 As such, empirical research in information fric-
tions in the health insurance market has generally focused on identifying friction hypotheses about
consumer behavior from individual insurance choices and exogenous variations in choice environ-
ment and examining the welfare effects of these information frictions on insurance costs or annual
out-of-pocket expenditures, taking medical care consumption as exogenous.5 Thus, information
has no effects on medical care consumption or health in these models. This research contributes to
the existing literature on health insurance choice and medical care use in several distinct ways. To
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to 1) use survey data on information possessed by
individuals while making choices and also model the potential endogeneity of this information in
order to 2) examine the causal impact of imperfect information on insurance selection as well as
subsequent medical care utilization and expenditures thus 3) allowing for dynamic effects of im-
perfect information through its impact on health outcomes. An additional advantage of modeling
the choice of medical care utilization is that I can identify effects of information on total medical
expenditures distinctly from its impact on individual out-of-pocket expenditures.
The dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides a survey of the relevant literature.
Chapter 3 gives a brief overview of the Medicare program. Theoretical motivation and the em-
pirical framework are provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the estimation strategy and
identification. The longitudinal data are described in Chapter 6. Discussion of results, parameter
estimates and policy simulations follows in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 summarizes the findings.
4Handel and Kolstad (2013) is the only other study using survey data that include information levels of participants.
5For example, Lin and Wildenbeest (2013) explore search costs, Handel (2013) explore switching costs, and Ho
et al. (2015) explore inattention. These studies also typically capture general equilibrium effects incorporating these
frictions in insurer pricing strategies. The present paper does not examine such pricing effects.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent empirical studies have documented suboptimal insurance choices in the health insur-
ance market in United States. Abaluck and Gruber (2011) use detailed Medicare Part D Pre-
scription Drug Plan claims and plan choice data to show that choices of the majority of Medicare
population are not consistent with optimization under full information. Instead, an alternative plan
in the individual’s choice set frequently offers better risk protection at a lower cost. Such inef-
ficient choices are not confined to the elderly. Bhargava et al. (2015) examine health insurance
decisions of employees at a large U.S. firm and find that a significant fraction of employees choose
financially dominated options, resulting in excess spending. They conclude that these choices re-
flect a severe deficit in health insurance literacy. Handel and Kolstad (2013) collect survey data
from employees at a large firm testing their knowledge of the available insurance options and find
considerable gaps in consumers’ knowledge.1 These information gaps matter for the insurance
choices observed in their data.
Several sources of information frictions that could lead to inefficient plan choices have been
identified in the literature. One explanation focuses on the presence of ‘search costs’, i.e., con-
sumers have to pay a fixed cost2 each time they examine another insurance plan and hence they
end up considering only a subset of the alternatives. Lin and Wildenbeest (2013) find evidence
for substantial search costs in the market for Medigap (supplemental) insurance policies. Another
consumer behavior that has been explored is ‘inertia’ or ‘switching costs’. Strombom et al. (2002)
find that price sensitivity in health plans is negatively correlated with age, job tenure and health risk
1The Beneficiary Needs and Knowledge Supplement component of the MCBS used in the paper has a similar
structure.
2This fixed cost can be thought of as the opportunity cost of time.
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variables that they interpret to be proxies for switching costs. Handel (2013) uses proprietary data
on health plan choices and medical utilization of employees and finds large estimates of switching
costs. Reducing these costs is beneficial for consumer welfare in a partial equilibrium framework,
but the same policy exacerbates adverse selection and reduces consumer welfare when insurer pric-
ing strategies are taken into account. Nosal (2012) uses the three level nested fixed point estimation
routine of Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009) to estimate switching costs for Medicare Advantage
(MA) Plans with market share data and finds that the percentage of consumers opting for Medicare
Advantage over FFS Medicare would more than triple in the absence of switching costs. Consumer
inattention is also posited as an explanation for inefficient choices in the literature. Ho et al. (2015)
estimate a model of consumer choice with inattentive consumers and explore the implications of
inattention for insurer pricing. In their model, consumers actively find information about their in-
surance choice set only when they are hit by a sufficiently large shock to their plan costs or health
in the last period. Their results show considerable consumer savings through reduced premiums
when inattention is removed.
In these studies of information frictions, medical care utilization is commonly assumed to be
exogenous, i.e., demand for medical care does not change with insurance. However, the choice of
health insurance affects the subsequent medical care utilization through its impact on the effective
prices of medical care, and both these decisions are affected by correlated unobserved factors.
Since medical care is an investment in the production of health, insurance choice also indirectly
affects health outcomes.
Several studies have examined the responsiveness of medical care utilization to insurance cov-
erage and its impact on health with varying results. One of the earliest studies in this context is
the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) (Manning et al., 1987). This study randomly as-
signed health insurance plans to participants and recorded their medical care consumption and
health outcomes over the next three to five years. The individuals in plans that had cost sharing
consumed less medical care than those who had free plans with no cost sharing. The reduction
in services had no adverse effect on participants’ health in general. However, the poorest and the
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sickest had better outcomes with a free plan. A more recent experimental study is the 2008 Ore-
gon HIE , which expanded the state’s Medicaid program to 10,000 additional low income adults
using a lottery (Finkelstein et al., 2011). The study finds an increase in medical care utilization and
reduction in financial strain due to the expansion but no significant effects on health within a one
year follow-up period. There are also many quasi-experimental studies that use potentially exoge-
nous shifts in insurance policy to control for insurance selection. For example, Currie and Gruber
(1996) and Dafny and Gruber (2005) use an expansion of Medicaid and Kolstad and Kowalski
(2012) use the Massachusetts market reforms. Due to the investment good nature of health, effects
of insurance selection are dynamic. A few studies examine this dynamic, long-term impact of
insurance on individual health outcomes using longitudinal data. Yang et al. (2009) model Medi-
care beneficiaries’ decisions to get supplemental insurance coverage for prescription drugs (prior
to the introduction of Prescription Drug Coverage through Medicare Part D in 2006) in a frame-
work where health evolves according to a production function (Grossman, 1972). They find that
prescription drug coverage increases expenditures on drugs and reduces mortality rates, but the
survivors have poorer health and higher total medical expenditures.
The studies analyzing the relationships between insurance selection, medical care utilization
and health, however, bypass issues of information frictions in consumer insurance choice and
assume decision-making under perfect information. By examining the impact of imperfect infor-
mation on insurance choices, which are allowed to impact subsequent medical care utilization and
evolution of health outcomes in a dynamic model, my research extends and contributes to both
the literature on information frictions in insurance choice and the literature examining effects of
insurance selection on medical care utilization and health.
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CHAPTER 3
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM
Medicare is a national social insurance program, administered by the U.S. federal government
since 1966, that guarantees access to health insurance for Americans aged 65 and older who have
worked and paid into the social security system. Younger people with disabilities as well as people
with end stage renal disease are also eligible under varying criteria.
Medicare initially had two parts: Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B. Part A covers inpatient
hospital stays and Part B helps pay for physician services not covered by Part A. Most Medicare
beneficiaries do not pay a monthly Part A premium because they have had 40 or more 3 month
quarters in which they paid Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes; monthly premium payments
are required for Part B. The Original Medicare was administered as a fee-for-service (FFS) program
(with no restriction on hospital or doctor networks from participating Medicare providers) with a
copayment rate (generally 20 per cent) and no cap on out-of-pocket expenditures. FFS Medicare
beneficiaries can buy supplemental insurance, which helps with the out-of-pocket costs and other
gaps in Parts A and B. This supplemental insurance may or may not cover prescription drugs.
In 2003, Medicare enabled beneficiaries to choose to receive their Medicare benefits from
Part C plans (also referred to as Medicare Advantage (MA) plans), which can be purchased from
private insurance companies. Part C plans are required to offer coverage that meets or exceeds the
standards set by Medicare and has a cap on out-of-pocket expenditures. Unlike original Medicare,
these plans generally restrict access to in-network doctors and hospitals. MA plans usually cover
more services (e.g., dental care, vision care etc.) than original Medicare . Some MA plans cover
prescription drugs also. While plans do not require any extra premium payments per se (other than
the Part B premium), Medicare beneficiaries may have to pay an extra premium amount for other
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MA services in some plans.
Medicare Part D came into effect in 2006. In order to receive this benefit, beneficiaries must
enroll in a stand-alone Prescription Drug Plan (PDP) or a Medicare Advantage plan with prescrip-
tion drug coverage (MA-PD). Prescription Drug Plans are offered by private insurance companies
(and subsidized by Medicare) who are free to choose which drugs they wish to cover and at what
tier they cover it. These plans usually have a premium, deductible and a copayment rate. Enroll-
ment in Part D is generally voluntary, however, some people who receive assistance under certain
federal programs are required to enroll.
The insurance choice set (I) of an individual obtaining their coverage through Medicare con-
sists of the eight possible combinations of FFS Medicare, Medicare Advantage, PDP and Supple-
mental Insurance (I ≡ [I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7, I8]) as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Insurance Plan Choices
Plan FFS Medicare Medicare Adv. PDP Supp. Ins.
I1
√
I2
√ √
I3
√ √
I4
√ √ √
I5
√
I6
√ √
I7
√ √
I8
√ √ √
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CHAPTER 4
MODEL
4.1 Theoretical Motivation
Grossman (1972) provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the demand for medical care
that can be derived from the impact of medical care inputs on individuals’ health. Since insurance
determines the effective marginal prices of medical care services, the indirect utility of insurance
is derived from its effect on the demand for medical care and health. Information about insurance
alternatives helps individuals make better (more efficient) insurance plan choices. I adapt the
Grossman approach to analyze the forward looking insurance and medical care decisions of the
elderly as well as their demand for information.
Individuals in the model derive utility from consumption (Ct) and health (Ht), where per-period
utility is Ut = U(Ct, Ht). Health is influenced by a stochastic ‘health shock’ (St) (e.g., develop-
ment of a chronic condition) and by curative medical care inputs (Mt) (e.g., hospital services,
physician services, prescription drugs) which may augment the natural depreciation of the health
stock over time or the negative impact of the stochastic shock. Additionally, preventive care med-
ical inputs (Ft) (e.g., screenings for cancer, diabetes) can enable detection of health conditions in
their early stages, thus preventing greater deterioration of health in the future. Non-medical care
inputs such as nutrition, exercise, abstinence from risky behaviors (such as smoking) also affect
health, although they are not modeled in this study due to lack of data on these health behaviors.
If Xt represents demographic characteristics such as age and education, and we discretize health
into h = 1, . . . H categories, then:
Pr(Ht+1 = h) = f
h(Ht, Xt, Ft, St,Mt), h = 1, ..., H
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and the probability of experiencing a health shock is written as:
Pr(St = 1) = g
S(Ht, Xt, Ft)
The out-of-pocket price of medical care faced by the individual is determined by whether the
medical care services are covered under the chosen insurance plan and, if covered, by the spe-
cific cost-sharing structure of the plan in terms of deductibles, coinsurance rate, copayments, and
limits on maximum out-of-pocket expenditures. Through its impact on the out-of-pocket price,
the insurance plan choice also affects an individual’s utilization of medical care, thus affecting
her health. These price and quantity (utilization) effects determine the individual’s out-of-pocket
expenditures and total expenditures on medical care.1 Consumption, Ct, (on goods other than med-
ical care) is the difference between the individual’s income and the amount spent on premiums and
out-of-pocket medical expenditures. The budget constraint of the individual is represented by:
Yt = Ct +P
I
t .(It, Ft,Mt)
where Yt is income , Ct is a composite consumption good with price normalized to 1 and PIt ≡
(P It , P
FI
t , P
MI
t ). P
I
t is the premium of insurance of plan I and (P
FI
t , P
MI
t ) denote the actual
effective price of preventive and curative medical services, respectively, when insurance plan I is
chosen in period t.
Each period, prior to the realization of uncertain health shocks (St), health insurance (It) is se-
lected. Medical care inputs (Mt, Ft) are then chosen and then health (Ht+1) evolves stochastically.
Thus, each period, conditional on her information about the insurance choice set, the individual
chooses among the coverage alternatives and levels of medical care utilization to maximize her re-
maining lifetime utility subject to per period budget constraints, the probability of realizing health
shocks, and the uncertain health production process. When individuals have imperfect information
1Total expenditures refer to the total costs borne by the insurance provider and the individual.
11
about the features of their insurance alternatives, the price structure, (PIt ≡ (P It , P FIt , PMIt )) under
a specific plan, as perceived by the individual, can be different from the actual prices and budget
constraint imposed by the plan, thus leading to ‘mistakes’ in insurance selection (i.e., choice of a
plan which is different from the lifetime utility maximizing plan under perfect information). A the-
oretical model detailing the impact of imperfect information on individual welfare and the process
of acquisition of costly information is provided in section A.1 of the Appendix.
A common assumption in models of information frictions is that once a product is chosen, its
attributes are automatically revealed to agents. It is difficult to extend this assumption to health
insurance plan choice. Uncertain features of the chosen insurance plan are frequently revealed
to consumers either after the consumption of medical care or while the decision to consume care
is being made. Hence, I allow imperfect information about the chosen insurance plan to persist
during the period. This allows information to have direct effects on medical care consumption
and expenditures in addition to the indirect effects through choice of insurance plan. For example,
uncertainty about coverage of preventive care medical services could lead to under-utilization of
these services thus negatively impacting long term health outcomes.2 In other words, information
could change the mix of medical care consumption chosen by individuals; informed individuals
are more likely to consume preventive care services and other forms of discretionary care (such
as regular follow-ups with their physicians) which could reduce their hospitalizations and more
intensive care episodes in the future.
The utility loss due to suboptimal insurance plan choices or consumption of an inefficient
mix of medical care services (or equivalently, the benefit of greater information), is likely to be
higher for individuals in poorer health status who are expecting higher medical consumption in the
period. The costs of acquiring information will also vary among individuals depending on access
to information technology (e.g., internet, personal computer), public information campaigns, and
2The utilization of preventive care services is largely discretionary and most of these services are covered under
Medicare. However, around 21 per cent of males in the 2009 MCBS are either not aware that screening for prostate
cancer is covered under Medicare (for all insurance choices) or are unsure about it, potentially leading to under-
utilization of these services.
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Figure 4.1: Timing of Annual Decisions, Health Shocks and Health Production
cognitive skills. Thus, the demand for information of a forward-looking individual will depend on
the benefits and costs of greater information.
Figure 4.1 depicts the timing of annual information seeking, insurance and medical care de-
cisions, health shocks, and health production that characterize the empirical model of individual
behavior. At the beginning of the year, an elderly person collects information about her insur-
ance alternatives (Kt) and makes a choice of insurance plan (It) for the year.3 After selecting her
insurance plan, she could choose to utilize preventive care medical services (Ft) such as screen-
ings or flu shots. Afterwards, the individual may or may not experience a health shock (St).
This health shock along with the existing health conditions of the individual coming into the year
and her insurance coverage affect curative medical care consumption (Mt ≡ (At, Nt)) during the
year. I model two categories of medical care: the first category is inpatient events (At), such as
hospitalizations, which are covered under Part A, and the second category is outpatient (such as
3Kt represents information about the features of the individuals’ insurance alternatives such as premiums, cover-
age, and deductibles. I acknowledge that information may not be available or perfect about other aspects of medical
care decision making and the evolution of health. For example, individuals may not be aware of their metabolism rate
or their genetic proclivity to obesity. I do not include such uncertainties and information problems as 1) their inclusion
would make the model intractable and 2) data on the individuals’ knowledge about these other aspects is not available.
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physician visits) and prescription drug events (Nt) which are covered under Parts B and D, re-
spectively.4 The utilization of preventive and curative medical services along with the prices of
medical care in the beneficiary’s region and her insurance coverage together determine the expen-
ditures (Et ≡ [EAt , ENt , EOt ]), where EAt is the total expenditure (incurred by the provider and the
individual) on inpatient services, ENt is the total expenditure on outpatient services and drugs
5 and
EOt is the out-of-pocket expenditure of the individual. At the end of the year, the health produc-
tion process, which depends on health shocks and medical care inputs during the year, determines
health next year (Ht+1 ≡ [Rt+1, Lt+1, Gt+1]), measured by the number of severity adjusted chronic
conditions (Rt+1), functional status (Lt+1) and self-reported health (Gt+1).
The information available to the individual at the beginning of each year is denoted by Ωt =
(Rt, Lt, Gt, Et−1, Xt, Zt). This information set includes observed health at the beginning of the pe-
riod summarized by the number of severity adjusted chronic conditions (Rt), functional status (Lt)
and self-reported health (Gt) entering period t. Et−1 is the total medical expenditure on medical
care services (i.e., Et−1 = EAt−1 + E
N
t−1) in the last period. Higher than expected expenditures in
a period could prompt individuals to seek more information in the next period. Therefore, I allow
lagged total medical care expenditure to influence individuals’ information as well as insurance
selection directly apart from its indirect effect through health. Information entering the period
also includes exogenous individual characteristics (Xt) such as education, income, and age, ex-
ogenous theoretically-relevant variables reflecting price and supply conditions for insurance, and
preventive and curative medical care (ZIt , Z
F
t , Z
M
t ) and exogenous shifters of information and
health (ZKt , Z
H
t ). The individual also knows all the current and lagged values of the permanent
and time-specific components of the optimization problem that are unobserved by the researcher.
4Consumption of outpatient services and drugs is relatively more discretionary than consumption of inpatient
services which are, quite frequently, urgent and non-discretionary. The effects of insurance coverage and information
is likely to differ across these two categories of curative care.
5Preventive care services are outpatient events and hence expenditures on preventive care services are part of ENt .
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4.2 Empirical Specification of Jointly Estimated Equations
1. Information
The expected value of being more informed about the insurance choice set depends on the
individual’s expectation of her medical care needs (i.e., her health during the period: Rt, Lt, Gt)
, exogenous individual characteristics such as age, education, and income (Xt), and exogenous
supply side or market characteristics (Zt) that affect the costs of acquiring information. In addition,
past medical care expenditures (Et−1) could affect information through pathways other than health.
For example, higher than expected realization of medical expenditures at the end of the year may
compel individuals to gather more information about their insurance alternatives.
The Beneficiary Needs and Knowledge supplement of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Sur-
vey (MCBS) reports respondent knowledge about the insurance choice set through a series of
questions which allow for ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ responses. (These questions are listed in
Section A.2 of the Appendix). I categorize the survey questions into three groups: questions re-
lated to Medicare Advantage Plans (QMA), questions related to Prescription Drug Plans (QPDP )
and questions related to coverage of preventive care services through Medicare (QPREV ). There
is one correct answer to each of these questions. The number of correct responses provided by
the beneficiary in each category measures how accurately informed she is about the insurance op-
tions/coverage benefits relevant to that category. Thus, Kt ≡ [K1t , K2t , K3t ], where K1t denotes
knowledge about Medicare Advantage Plans, K2t denotes knowledge about Prescription Drug
Plans andK3t denotes knowledge about coverage of preventive care services offered through Medi-
care.6 Entering period t, the individual observes the state variables Ωt = [Rt, Lt, Gt, Et−1, Xt, Zt]
where Zt = [ZKt , Z
I
t , Z
F
t , Z
M
t , Z
H
t ]. The value of a given information level (k1, k2, k3) measured
by k1 correct responses to questions relevant to Medicare Advantage plans, k2 correct responses
to questions relevant to PDPs, and k3 correct responses to questions relevant to preventive care
6Knowledge about preventive care services directly affects utilization of these services, but it could also impact
insurance choice through under-estimation or over-estimation of benefits offered through Medicare. For example, if
individuals incorrectly think that preventive care services are not covered by Medicare (even though they actually are),
they might prefer to choose some supplemental insurance for this perceived coverage gap.
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coverage benefits of Medicare, can be written as7
V Kk1k2k3t = v
K(Rt, Lt, Gt, Et−1, Xt, Zt, K1t = k1, K
2
t = k2, K
3
t = k3) (4.1)
The variation in the observed arguments of V Kk1k2k3t (captured by the function v
K) explains only a
part of the variation in K observed in the data. Unobserved individual characteristics (which may
not be completely idiosyncratic) influence the number of correct responses given by the individual.
These unobservables can be divided into three components. The first part, µK , captures permanent
or time-independent unobserved individual heterogeneity that affects the value of k. The second
part, νKt , represents time varying unobserved individual heterogeneity that affects value of k. The
third part Kt is a serially uncorrelated error term that expresses an individual’s random preference
for information.
Treating the number of correct answers in each category as a continuous measure of informa-
tion and taking into account the three components of unobserved heterogeneity, I model informa-
tion with the following estimation equations
ki = αi0 + α
i
1Rt + α
i
2Lt + α
i
3Gt + α
i
4Et−1 + α
i
5Xt
+ αi6Z
K
t + α
i
7Z
I
t + α
i
8Z
F
t + α
i
9Z
M
t + α
i
10Z
H
t + µ
Ki + νK
i
t + 
Ki
t (4.2)
where i=1, 2, 3 and ki is the number of correct answers in category i and µKi and νKi are pa-
rameters to be estimated. While individuals in the model gather information at the beginning of
each period, they may have also acquired some knowledge about their chosen insurance plan last
year through medical care consumption or interactions with care personnel during the course of the
year. I include insurance choice in the last period as an explanatory variable in the final estimation
7The function defining the value of choosing an information precision (higher precision leads to greater informa-
tion) is derived from a theoretical model of endogenous information choice provided in the appendix. (For details,
refer to equation A.5 in Section A.1 of the Appendix.) Since the actual information depends on the precision chosen
by the individual and a random component, the arguments of the value function for information are the same as the
arguments for the value function of information precision.
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equations for information (equation 4.2) to allow for such learning effects. The demand for differ-
ent categories of information are correlated through both permanent individual unobservables (µ)
and time-varying individual unobservables (νt).
2. Insurance Choice
Let I denote the set of insurance alternatives available to an elderly person listed in Table
3.1. The indirect utility of each plan depends on the plan’s price (premium),8 its non-pecuniary
attributes (e.g., reputation of the provider, plan rating, and ease of filing claims), the cost-sharing
and coverage characteristics associated with the plan, the individual’s expectation of her medical
care needs (captured by health) and medical care prices.9 With imperfect information about plan
features, individuals’ perceived utility of a plan would depend on the extent of their knowledge.
The expected indirect utility of choosing the insurance plan I ∈ I conditional on the individual’s
information is given by
V IIt = v
I(Rt, Lt, Gt, Et−1, Xt, ZIt , Z
F
t , Z
H
t , Z
M
t , It = I|Kt) + uIIt (4.3)
Decomposing the error term uIIt into permanent, time varying and idiosyncratic error terms as
discussed above, we obtain
uIIt = µ
I
I + ν
I
It + 
I
It (4.4)
Since individuals cannot select both FFS and Part C Medicare, I summarize the insurance plan
chosen by the individual using three binary choice variables: the decision to take original FFS
Medicare or an MA plan, the decision to take up Part D (PDP) or not, and the decision to get
supplemental insurance or not. Let IMAt take the value 1 when the individual chooses a Medicare
8As multiple Medicare Advantage plans are typically available to the individual, premium for the broader category
of Medicare Advantage plans could be thought of as the premium of the best available MA plan in terms of price and
coverage and similarly, for Prescription Drug Plans and Supplemental Insurance Plans.
9Unfortunately, several aspects of health insurance such as coinsurance, deductibles are either not observed in the
data (e.g. in case of MA plans) or do not vary across individuals (e.g. in case of Original Medicare), and, hence,
cannot be included in the estimation.
17
Advantage Plan and 0 when FFS Medicare is chosen. IPDPt takes the value 1 when a Prescrip-
tion Drug Plan (Part D) is chosen for drug coverage; 0 otherwise. IPDPt takes the value 1 when
supplemental insurance is chosen; 0, otherwise.
Substituting equation 4.4 into 4.3 we get
V IIt = v
I(Rt, Lt, Gt, Et−1, Xt, ZIt , Z
F
t , Z
H
t , Z
M
t , It = I|Kt) + µII + νIIt + IIt (4.5)
Approximating the vI(.) function in 4.5 with a series expansion of its arguments and assuming
a type I extreme value distribution for the idiosyncratic error term IIt, the log odds ratio of choosing
Ijt is given by the following expression.
ln
[
Pr(Ijt = 1)
Pr(Ijt = 0)
]
= β0 +β
j
1Rt +β
j
2Lt +β
j
3Gt +β
j
4Xt +β
j
5It−1 +β
j
6Et−1 +β
j
7k
1
t +β
j
8k
2
t +β
j
9k
3
t
+ βj7Z
I
t + β
j
8Z
F
t + β
j
9Z
M
t + β
j
10Z
H
t + µ
I
j + ν
I
jt + 
I
jt (4.6)
where j= MA, PDP, SUPP.
Certain subgroups of the elderly population qualify for additional coverage options such as
Medicaid (dual eligibility on the basis of income) or VA coverage (eligibility due to veteran sta-
tus). These coverage options cannot be ‘chosen’ by the beneficiaries at will and hence cannot be
included in a single choice set for all individuals. At the same time, eligibility for these additional
options is surely expected to have implications for their coverage. For example, full Medicaid
status covers prescription drugs, thus making Part D plans redundant for such beneficiaries. Simi-
larly, coverage available to veterans through VA may also include prescription drugs. Some states
also mandate automatic enrollment in managed care plans for Medicaid eligible individuals. One
way of dealing with this issue could be to allow the choice set to vary by the eligibility of the ben-
eficiaries for programs such as Medicaid, VA coverage, and Employer Offered Insurance (ESI).
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However, while it is possible to completely specify the choice set a dual eligible or a veteran bene-
ficiary, the data used in this study is not rich enough to identify the actual plan choice made in such
cases.10 Thus, I keep a single choice set (as in Table 3.1) common to all beneficiaries and treat
‘dual eligibility’, ‘veteran status’ and ‘access to employer sponsored insurance’ as additional indi-
vidual characteristics that explain the probabilities of having an MA plan, a PDP or supplemental
insurance as well as the other dependent variables of the model. I also allow lagged insurance
(It−1) in the estimation equation to capture inertia effects in health insurance plan choice.
3. Demand for Preventive Care
After the insurance plan is has been selected, the individual can choose to seek preventive care
services (which include screenings such as mammogram, cardiovascular screening, flushots, and
routine eye exams). Utilization of preventive care services can lead to early detection of health
problems and can prevent greater deterioration of health in the future. Since I do not assume that
all features of the chosen insurance plan are revealed automatically after the selection of the plan,
this decision is conditional on the information possessed by the individual and the insurance plan
chosen. Most preventive care services are covered under Medicare.11 Hence, less knowledge about
coverage of preventive care services generally implies that the individual either incorrectly thinks
that the preventive care service is not covered or is uncertain about it, when it is actually covered,
leading to under-utilization of these services.
Ft is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when a female uses one or more of the four preven-
tive care services (mammogram, papsmear, flushot, eye exam) or when a male uses one or more
of three services (PSA blood test, flushot, eyeexam). Incidence of cancer increases exponentially
with advancing age and cancer screenings are the most recommended forms of preventive care for
senior citizens (Berger et al., 2006).12
10For example, we cannot distinguish between individuals with full versus part Medicaid eligibility or between a
Medicaid managed care plan versus a FFS plan.
11Exceptions are routine eye exams and dental check-ups.
12Data considerations also drive the selection of these particular services. Because the claims data for MA plan
holders is not complete, use of survey data for utilization of preventive care services is preferred.
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The value function for preventive care and its arguments are:
V Fft = v
F (Rt, Lt, Gt, Xt, Et−1, ZFt , Z
M
t , Z
H
t |Kt, It) + uFft (4.7)
which leads to the following estimation equation:
ln
[
Pr(Ft = 1)
Pr(Ft = 0)
]
= γ0 + γ1Rt + γ2Lt + γ3Gt
+ γ4Xt + γ5Et−1 + γ6k1t + γ7k
2
t + γ8k
3
t + γ9I
MA
t + γ10I
PDP
t + γ11I
SUPP
t
+ γ12Z
F
t + γ13Z
M
t + γ14Z
H
t + µ
F + νFt + 
F
t (4.8)
4. Health Shock
The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) provides detailed survey data on the ben-
eficiaries’ chronic conditions and the complications associated with these chronic conditions. A
health shock is defined as an onset of a new chronic condition related to heart problems, respiratory
problems, cancer and diabetes (since these are the most common disabling conditions among the
elderly and they also tend to be the cost drivers of elderly medical expenditures (Wolff et al., 2002;
Yang et al., 2009). Individuals with existing chronic conditions can also experience a health shock
if severity of these conditions increases.13 An adverse health shock (St=1) implies that the individ-
ual’s severity adjusted chronic conditions increases by 1 in the next period (i.e., Rt+1 = Rt + 1).
The log odds ratio of having a health shock in period t relative to not having a health shock is
given by
ln
[
Pr(St = 1)
Pr(St = 0)
]
= δ0 + δ1Rt + δ2Lt + δ3Gt + δ4Xt + δ5Ft + δ6Z
H
t + µ
S + νSt (4.9)
Health status entering the period (Rt, Lt, Gt), demographic characteristics (Xt), and the utilization
of preventive care services (Ft) affect the probability of experiencing a health shock. County and
13For example, severity increases if an individual with an existing heart condition experiences increased hyperten-
sion, high cholestrol, hardening of the arteries or an individual with diabetes experiences eye problems.
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year differences in health-related exogenous variables (ZHt ) also influence the onset of a chronic
condition or an increase in complications associated with a condition. These health shocks are
correlated with permanent and time-varying unobservables that determine the other behaviors (in-
formation seeking, insurance and preventive care selection, medical care demand and functionality
transitions) captured by µS and νSt in the above estimation equation.
5. Medical Care Demand and Expenditures
The demand for medical care is derived from its effect on the individual’s lifetime utility which
consists of two parts: the contemporaneous utility, and the expected present discounted value of
utility in the future conditional on medical care choices in the period. Medical care utilization
affects contemporaneous utility through its effect on expenditures on medical care (and hence,
consumption). This effect on current period utility varies with the health insurance selected for the
period (It) and exogenous prices of medical care (ZMt ). Expected future utility from medical care
consumption this period depends on the effectiveness of medical care in maintaining or improving
health next period which varies with observed health shocks (St), as well as health status entering
the period (Ht ≡ (Rt, Lt, Gt)). I also allow lagged medical care expenditure to affect current
medical consumption through channels other than health.14
The value function corresponding to a choice of medical care with its arguments is given by
V Man = v
M(Rt, Lt, Gt, Et−1, Xt, At = a,Nt = n|Kt, It, Ft, St) + uMant (4.10)
At is measured by the number of inpatient events during the course of the year and Nt is the total
number of outpatient and prescription drug events in the decision year. Since there is considerable
skewness in the utilization of inpatient services (around 30 per cent of the individuals do not have
any inpatient events and a small percentage have extremely high number of such events), I model
annual (log) utilization of inpatient services as the joint product of the probability of any utilization
14For example, hospitalizations in the previous period could necessitate follow-ups, physician visits or drug use in
future periods.
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(using a logit equation) and the log of utilization, if any (treated as a continuous outcome). Since
the estimation sample consists largely of the elderly, only 3 per cent of the individuals do not use
any outpatient services or drugs (Nt). Hence, I simply model log of Nt for utilization of outpatient
services and drugs. The probability of any inpatient utilization (At) is given by:
ln
[
Pr(At > 0)
Pr(At = 0)
]
= λ0 + λ1Rt + λ2Lt + λ3Gt
+ λ4Xt + λ5Et−1 + λ6St + λ7IMAt + λ8I
PDP
t + λ9I
SUPP
t
+ λ10k
1
t + λ11k
2
t + λ12k
3
t + λ13Z
M
t + µ
A1 + νA1t (4.11)
Log use of inpatient service use, At, is modeled as:
ln(At|At > 0) = ψ0 + ψ1Rt + ψ2Lt + ψ3Gt
+ ψ4Xt + ψ5Et−1 + ψ6St + ψ7IMAt + ψ8I
PDP
t + ψ9I
SUPP
t
+ ψ10k
1
t + ψ11k
2
t + ψ12k
3
t + ψ13Z
M
t + µ
A2 + νA2t (4.12)
and log use of outpatient services and prescription drug utilization, Nt, is modeled as:
ln(Nt) = τ0 + τ1Rt + τ2Lt + τ3Gt
+ τ4Xt + τ5Et−1 + τ6St + τ7Ft + τ8IMAt + τ9I
PDP
t + τ10I
SUPP
t
+ τ11k
1
t + τ12k
2
t + τ13k
3
t + τ14Z
M
t + µ
N + νNt (4.13)
The demands for each type of medical care are estimated jointly (along with information, insur-
ance, shocks, and health production) and are correlated through both permanent individual unob-
servables (µ) and contemporaneous time-varying individual unobservables (νt).
Once the individual selects medical care, her medical expenditures are determined as a func-
tion of her chosen insurance plan, total utilization and medical care prices in her area of residence.
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Apart from the indirect effect of information on medical expenditures through its effect on in-
surance choice, and, preventive and medical care utilization, the estimation equation allows for
independent effects of information on expenditures. Three types of medical expenditures are mod-
eled: total medical expenditures (incurred by the provider and the individual) corresponding to the
At utilization, EAt ; total medical expenditures corresponding to Nt utilization, E
N
t ; and, total out-
of-pocket expenditures of the individual (including insurance payments), EOt . Thus, the estimation
equation for total medical expenditures on inpatient services is given by:
ln(EAt |At > 0) = τA0 + τA1 Rt + τA2 Lt + τA3 Gt
+ τA4 Xt + τ
A
5 At + τ
A
6 St + τ
A
7 I
MA
t + τ
A
8 I
PDP
t + τ
A
9 I
SUPP
t
+ τA10k
1
t + τ
A
11k
2
t + τ
A
12k
3
t + τ
A
13Z
M
t + µ
EA + νE
A
t (4.14)
The estimation equation for total medical expenditures on outpatient services and drugs is:
ln(ENt ) = τ
N
0 + τ
N
1 Rt + τ
N
2 Lt + τ
N
3 Gt
+ τN4 Xt + τ
N
5 Nt + τ
N
6 St + τ
N
7 I
MA
t + τ
N
8 I
PDP
t + τ
N
9 I
SUPP
t
+ τN10k
1
t + τ
N
11k
2
t + τ
N
12k
3
t + τ
N
13Z
M
t + µ
EN + νE
N
t (4.15)
and the equation for total out-of-pocket expenditures is:
ln(EOt ) = τ
O
0 + τ
O
1 Rt + τ
O
2 Lt + τ
O
3 Gt
+ τO4 Xt + τ
O
5 At + τ
O
6 Nt + τ
O
7 St + τ
O
8 I
MA
t + τ
O
9 I
PDP
t + τ
O
10I
SUPP
t
+ τO11k
1
t + τ
O
12k
2
t + τ
O
13k
3
t + τ
O
14Z
M
t + µ
EO + νE
O
t (4.16)
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6. Health Production
Apart from the number of severity adjusted chronic conditions (Rt) which are automatically
updated from the initial number of conditions and the value of the shock variable, I model two ad-
ditional measures of health: functional status (Lt) and self-reported health (Gt). Functional status
is an objective measure of health capturing the number of ADL(Activities of Daily Living) limita-
tions and number of IADL(Instrumental Activities of Daily Living) limitations. More specifically,
the functional status is a categorical variable that takes the value, Lt+1 = 0, when there are no ADL
or IADL limitations and Lt+1 = 1, when the individual has at least one IADL limitation and up
to two ADL limitations (moderate disability), Lt+1 = 2, when there are more than two limitations
(severe disability), and Lt+1 = 3, when the individual realizes the extreme outcome of death in the
next period. The log odds of functional status relative to no limitation in functions is specified as:
ln
[
Pr(Lt+1 = a)
Pr(Lt+1 = 0)
]
= χa1Rt + χ
a
2Lt + χ
a
3Gt + χ
a
4St + χ
a
5StAt + χ
a
6StNt + χ
a
7Xt
+ χa8RtAt + χ
a
9RtNt + χ
a
101(Lt = 1)At + χ
a
111(Lt = 1)Nt + χ
a
121(Lt = 2)At + χ
a
131(Lt = 2)Nt
+ χa14GtAt + χ
a
15GtNt + µ
aL + νaLt (4.17)
where a=1, 2 or 3.
Interactions of shock with medical care use are included to capture the impact of medical care
in tempering the effect of shocks on health. Interactions of the two types of medical care with
the number of severity-adjusted chronic conditions, the functional status and self-reported health
entering the period are also included to allow the productivity of medical care to differ by health
status.
The third measure of health used in the model is self-reported health. In the survey data,
individuals report their health ranging from excellent to poor. This subjective measure of health is
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treated as a continuous variable for the purpose of estimation.15
Gt+1 = χ
G
1 Rt + χ
G
2 Lt + χ
G
3 Gt + χ
G
4 St + χ
G
5 StAt + χ
G
6 StNt + χ
G
7 Xt
+χG8 RtAt +χ
G
9 RtNt +χ
G
101(Lt = 1)At +χ
G
111(Lt = 1)Nt +χ
G
121(Lt = 2)At +χ
G
131(Lt = 2)Nt
+ χG14GtAt + χ
G
15GtNt + µ
G + νGt (4.18)
The dynamics of health are captured by the dependence of functional status and self-reported
health next period on endogenous values of current functional status and self-reported health. Ad-
ditionally, health transitions are dynamic because they depend on medical care consumption in the
current period. It should be noted that health production depends on other inputs such as nutrition,
exercise, and risky behaviors (e.g., smoking) which are not modeled in this research due to lack of
data. These omitted inputs are a part of the unobserved heterogeneity in the model. For example,
proclivity to engage in risky behaviors like smoking is likely to be a permanent characteristic of
the individual and hence gets included in the µ component which persists over time. Other unob-
servables (such as health shocks not captured by chronic conditions) are modeled as part of the
time-varying component of the unobserved heterogeneity, νt.
Table 4.1 displays the dependent variables and the explanatory variables for the jointly esti-
mated system of equations in the model.
7. Initial Conditions
Additional reduced-form equations are included in the model to explain the initially-observed
values of functional status, the number of severity-adjusted chronic conditions, self-reported health,
insurance plan choice and medical care expenditures. These initial conditions cannot be modeled
using the dynamic equations described above because we do not observe the previous behavior
that influences their outcomes. Hence, the initial conditions are reduced-form analogs of the dy-
namic demand and health production equations with appropriate exogenous variables included for
15There are five categories of self-reported health and a multinomial logit model would considerably increase the
number of parameters to be estimated.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Equation Specifications
Dependent
Variable Estimator Explanatory Variables
Endogenous Exogenous Unobs’d het
Kt OLS Ht, Et−1, It−1 Xt, ZKt , Z
I
t , Z
F
t , Z
M
t , Z
H
t µ
K , νKt
It Logit Ht, Et−1, It−1, Kt Xt, ZIt , Z
F
t , Z
M
t , Z
H
t µ
I , νIt
Ft Logit Ht, Et−1, Kt, It Xt, ZFt , Z
M
t , Z
H
t µ
F , νFt
St Logit Ht, Ft Xt, ZHt µ
S, νSt
Mt OLS Ht, Et−1, Kt, It, St Xt, ZMt µ
M , νMt
Et OLS Ht, Kt, It, St,Mt Xt, ZMt µ
E, νEt
Ht+1 Mlogit Ht, St,Mt Xt µH , νHt
identification. A description of the initial condition specifications is provided in Section A.3 of the
Appendix.
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CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION
The demand and production functions specified above form the set of jointly estimated equa-
tions of the empirical model. These equations are correlated through observed explanatory vari-
ables, as well as permanent (µ) and time varying (νt) unobservables that enter each equation. This
specification of the unobserved heterogeneity1 allows for serial correlation within outcomes over
time as well as two different sources of correlation across outcomes. The permanent heterogeneity
is captured by the joint distribution of
µ = [µK , µI , µF , µS, µA1, µA2, µN , µE, µL, µG].
Similarly, time-varying heterogeneity is defined by the joint distribution of
νt = [ν
K
t , ν
I
t , ν
F
t , ν
S
t , ν
A1
t , ν
A2
t , ν
N
t , ν
E
t , ν
L
t , ν
G
t ].
Instead of imposing a specific form (such as normal) on these multivariate distributions, I model the
unobserved heterogeneity as random effects and approximate its unknown distribution discretely,
estimating both the mass points along the support of the unobserved components as well as the
associated probability weights. This flexible estimation technique, termed as Discrete Factor Ran-
dom Effects(DFRE) (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Mroz and Guilkey, 1992; Mroz, 1999), has been
used in a wide variety of empirical applications including health.2 The DFRE method performs
1Model estimation must account for unobserved heterogeneity (which could produce a spurious correlation be-
tween dependent variables and endogenous explanatory variables), in order to reduce the bias in estimated coefficients
that arises from inclusion of endogenous variables, omission of relevant variables or measurement error.
2See Blau and Gilleskie (2001); Mello et al. (2002); Yang et al. (2009); and Fout and Gilleskie (2015).
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as well as maximum likelihood estimation assuming normality, when the true distribution of the
error terms is jointly normal and performs better (in terms of precision and bias) when the true
distribution is not normal. The DFRE approach allows unobservable (to the researcher) individ-
ual characteristics to impact all jointly- estimated equations and integrates over their distributions
when constructing the likelihood function. Specification of the likelihood function is provided in
Section A.4 of the Appendix.
Estimation of dynamic equations with panel data requires exogeneity of some explanatory
variables conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity. The system of dynamic equations is, in
part, identified by the inclusion of exogenous, theoretically relevant variables, Zt =(ZKt , Z
I
t , Z
F
t ,
ZM , ZHt ) that affect the behavior/outcome in one equation but do not affect other endogenous
variables independently. A description of these identifying Z variables, the data sources and the
specific equations in which they belong is provided in Table 5.1.
The ‘Medicare and You’ book is a comprehensive book providing a detailed description of all
insurance options available through Medicare and is mailed to all current beneficiaries but may
not be received by some elderly persons due to exogenous factors such as a change of address or
loss of mail. Whether the individual receives the book or not, affects information but, conditional
on her knowledge, does not impact subsequent choices of insurance, medical care, or the health
production process. Similarly, having a personal computer at home impacts an individual’s infor-
mation but does not impact her other choices or outcomes independent of its effect on information.
Number of MA plans and PDPs, and their average premiums, in the beneficiary’s area, are supply
side factors that affect the choice of insurance. But conditional on the insurance plan chosen, these
factors do not affect subsequent decisions and outcomes. Similarly, the number of hospitals with
full-field digital mammography techniques and the number of radiology technicians per thousand
population determine the access and quality of preventive medical services available to the bene-
ficiary but do not have independent effects on choice of medical care or the production of health.
The number of hospitals, hospital beds, physician-dentists, and licensed pharmacists per thousand
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population capture the individual’s access to curative medical care services, thus affecting utiliza-
tion of these services. The median air quality index (a measure of air quality that is provided
by the Environmental Protection Agency), at the county level, is used as an exogenous shifter of
health. Conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity (µ and νt), lagged values of the endogenous
variables also aid identification (assuming no serial correlation in the remaining errors). Finally,
functional forms of the non-linear equations (the logit and the multinomial logits) of the model
provide identification.
Table 5.1: Description of Exogenous Identifying Variables
Dependent Variable Exclusion Restrictions Source level
Information Beneficiary received Medicare and You Book? MCBS individual
Beneficiary has personal computer at home? MCBS individual
Insurance No. of MA plans in beneficiary area MCBS individual
No. of PDP plans in beneficiary area KFF state
Average PDP plan premium in beneficiary area KFF state
Preventive Care No. of radiology techs per thousand AHRF county
No. of hospitals with full-field digit mammography AHRF county
Medical care Medicare Part A reimbursement rate AHRF county
No. of hospitals per thousand AHRF county
No. of hospital beds per thousand AHRF county
No. of physician-dentists per thousand AHRF county
No. of licensed pharmacists AHRF county
No. of pharma techs per thousand AHRF county
Health Median Air Quality Index EPA county
AHRF: Area Health Resource Files (2006-11) , KFF- Kaiser Family Foundation State health facts
EPA- Environmental Protection Agency
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CHAPTER 6
DATA
The Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) is a longitudinal survey of Medicare ben-
eficiaries conducted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The MCBS files
combine survey data from the beneficiaries with claims data to provide a complete picture of med-
ical care utilization and expenditures. As part of the survey data, respondents answer questions
about demographics, health insurance, health status and medical events and expenditures. Re-
spondents are followed for a maximum period of four years after which they are phased out to
introduce new participants, keeping the overall cross-sectional demographic composition of the
survey constant across years.
This study uses MCBS files from 2006 to 2011. As Medicare Part D went into effect in 2006,
the number of choices available increased considerably.1 Due to the rotating panel nature of the
data, respondents are observed for varying numbers of years from 2006-2011.2 There is relatively
little attrition due to non-response.
For the construction of the final estimation sample, younger individuals who qualify for Medi-
care due to disability status or End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) are dropped from the analysis
as these individuals are likely to be much different from the elderly population with Medicare.
Individuals living in long-term care facilities are also excluded from the analysis.3 I also excluded
beneficiaries whose survey information was completed by their proxies and individuals who re-
ported not selecting their own insurance plan (i.e., their plan was chosen by a proxy, usually an
12011 is the last year of complete data available from CMS.
2For example, beneficiaries who entered the survey in 2004 are observed for only two years (2006 and 2007) in the
estimation sample.
3It is unlikely that these individuals would be making their own health insurance and medical care decisions.
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adult child or a spouse). However, respondents who report receiving help on their insurance deci-
sions are included in the sample.4 Table 6.1 provides additional information on the sample used for
estimation, which consists of 17,813 individuals who contribute 52,282 person-year observations.
Table 6.1: Empirical Distribution of Sample Participants
Years followed Number of individuals Percentage of Sample
At least 2 years 17,813 100
At least 3 years 10,923 61.32
At least 4 years 5,733 32.18
Exactly 2 years 6,890 38.68
Exactly 3 years 5,190 29.14
Exactly 4 years 5,733 32.18
2006 7,531 14.40
2007 10,245 19.60
2008 9,417 18.01
2009 9,197 17.59
2010 9,282 17.75
2011 6,610 12.64
Number of unique individuals 17,813
Number of person-year observations 52,282
Information possessed by an individual regarding Medicare Advantage plans is measured by
the number of correct responses to Medicare Advantage related questions5 and similarly for Pre-
scription Drug plans and preventive care coverage benefits of Medicare. Only 22 per cent of the
elderly give all correct responses to Medicare Advantage related questions and approximately the
same percentage give all incorrect answers. The percentage of elderly who give all correct re-
sponses to Prescription Drug Coverage (PDP) related questions is 32 per cent while less than 13
per cent answer all drug coverage related questions incorrectly.
Table 6.2 shows one-year transitions in the number of correct MA responses given by the
sample participants. While we observe some persistence in information, it is clear that there is
4Whether the individual received help in insurance selection or not is controlled for in the estimation equations.
5See Section A.2 of the Appendix for the list of questions used in construction of information measures.
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considerable movement across information categories too (i.e., individuals acquire and lose (for-
get) information). The average information possessed generally declines with age suggesting the
importance of cognitive costs in acquiring information (Figure 6.1).6
FFS Medicare is the primary form of health insurance (69 per cent) chosen by the elderly.
Just over half(54 per cent) of the beneficiaries choose a Prescription Drug Plan for drug coverage
and 66 per cent have some form of supplemental insurance (e.g., Medigap, Employer Sponsored
Insurance (ESI)).
Table 6.2: One Year Information Transitions
# correct MA responses(t)
# correct MA responses(t-1)
0 1 2 3 Total
0 38 27 21 14 100
1 23 31 27 19 100
2 15 22 33 29 100
3 9 16 30 45 100
Total 21 24 28 26 100
Source: MCBS. The numbers show the percentage of sample participants
in each information category.
The average annual expenditures on inpatient services (covered by Part A) and outpatient ser-
vices and prescription drugs (combined) during this time period were $7,838 and $8,341 respec-
tively. While Part A expenditures increase with age, expenditures on outpatient events and drugs
follow a U-shaped pattern (Figure 6.3). The average individual out-of-pocket expenditures (in-
cluding insurance premiums) of sample participants was $2,211, which also shows an increasing
trend with age.
Health status is measured by two objective measures: functional status and the number of
chronic conditions. Functional status is measured by the number of Activities of Daily Living
(ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) reported in the survey files of the
6Solid lines represent the observed statistics from the actual sample. The simulated observations indicated by
dashed lines are discussed later in Chapter 7.
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Figure 6.1: Actual and Simulated Number of Correct Responses, by Age
Figure 6.2: Actual and Simulated Probability of Different Types of Insurance, by Age
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Figure 6.3: Actual and Simulated Medical Care Expenditures, by Age
MCBS. Approximately 14 per cent of the sample respondents report having moderate disability
with at least one IADL and with no more than two ADLs and 8 per cent report having severe
disability with three or more ADLs. The MCBS survey data provides detailed information on the
beneficiaries’ chronic conditions and severity of these conditions. Four different types of chronic
conditions — heart, respiratory, cancer and diabetes — are considered for constructing the initial
number of chronic conditions. This number (measuring severity-adjusted chronic conditions) is
updated with the development of a new condition or an increase in severity of an existing one.
Self-reported health on a scale of 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent) is used as a measure of an individual’s
subjective evaluation of her health.
Table 6.3 describes the individual-specific demographic variables used to explain information,
insurance selection, medical care use and expenditures and health status. The dependent variables
— information, insurance, preventive and medical care use, medical expenditures and health —
are used as endogenous explanatory variables in the relevant equations determined by the timing
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Table 6.3: Description of Exogenous Individual Variables
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation
Time-invariant individual characteristics
Years of schooling (range:10-19 years) 13.76 3.19
Female (omitted: male) 0.58 0.49
Race (omitted: white)
Black 0.08 0.27
Other Race 0.05 0.21
Time-varying individual characteristics
Age (range: 65-105) 76.80 7.24
Rural (omitted: Urban) 0.26 0.44
Not married (omitted: Married) 0.47 0.50
Annual Income (000’s of year 2011 dollars) 29.32 51.42
of the model. Additionally, exogenous variables (usually capturing supply and price conditions)
specified in Table 5.1 are used as explanatory variables.
Figure 6.4 shows the unconditional relationship between insurance choice and out-of-pocket
expenditures. Relative to FFS Medicare, out-of-pocket expenditures associated with a Medicare
Advantage Plan are lower across the age distribution. Average individual out-of-pocket expendi-
tures are somewhat lower for those without a Prescription Drug Plan, particularly, in the early ages.
However, the variation in out-of-pocket expenditures is higher for individuals without a Prescrip-
tion Drug Plan. For consumers who choose to buy supplemental insurance, average out-of-pocket
expenditures are higher at all ages relative to those who do not have supplemental insurance. As
we would expect, the variance associated with out-of-pocket expenditures across the age distri-
bution is lower with the purchase of supplemental insurance. Figure 6.5 shows the unconditional
relationship between information and insurance choices in the data. For the purpose of this graph,
an individual is ‘more informed’ if they are able to answer at least two Medicare Advantage related
questions, at least two Prescription Drug Plan related questions and at least five questions related
to Medicare coverage of preventive care.7 An individual is ‘less informed’ if the number of correct
7Approximately, 20 per cent of the sample are ‘more informed’ and 16 percent are ‘less informed’.
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Figure 6.4: Out-of-Pocket Expenditures, by Insurance Choice
answers to Medicare Advantage and PDP related questions is less than one each and the number of
correct answers to preventive care related questions is less than 3. As seen in the graph, the proba-
bility of selecting a Medicare Advantage plan is much higher in the group that is more informed at
all ages. The same relationship is found with the choice of a Prescription Drug Plan. However, the
probability of selecting supplemental insurance does not differ across the more and less informed
subgroups of individuals.
While it is informative to look at the unconditional relationships between the outcomes of
interest in the data, the dynamic causal relationships between them can be established only through
estimation of the empirical model (specified in Chapter 5), which takes into account the sequential
nature of the decision making and controls for the unobserved heterogeneity. To this end, we
proceed to Chapter 7 to discuss the results obtained from model estimation.
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Figure 6.5: Choice of Insurance Plan, by Information
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CHAPTER 7
RESULTS
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the signs and significance of the coefficients of the
main explanatory variables in the estimation equations. These numbers describe the qualitative,
short-term (static) effects. Three mass points (each) were found to be sufficient for capturing the
distributions of permanent and time varying individual unobserved heterogeneity that is likely to
influence choices and outcomes of the model.1 In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the
model fit and results from five-year simulations of the jointly estimated system of equations under
alternate information scenarios that impact endogenous state variables over time. These results
illustrate the long-term, dynamic effects of information.
7.1 Parameter Estimates
I begin by examining the factors that explain the heterogeneity in information observed in the
data, followed by an analysis of the impact of imperfect information on individual choices and
outcomes.
1. Information
Table 7.1 displays parameter estimates for selected variables explaining information variation
in the data for each of the information categories. The number of chronic conditions at the be-
ginning of the period has a positive significant impact on information about MA Plans, PDPs and
preventive care coverage benefits available through Medicare. Individuals with functional limita-
tions (moderately disabled, severely diabled) are more likely to know about MA Plans and PDPs
but have less knowledge about preventive care service coverage relative to individuals with no
functional limitations. Having an MA plan or a PDP in the last period is a strong predictor (in
1Adding additional points of support for each discrete distribution did not improve the fit of the model.
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terms of both magnitude and significance) of greater knowledge about these insurance plans. The
importance of lagged insurance choices suggests that there could be ‘learning through use’ effects,
(i.e., beneficiaries learn about their chosen plan through utilization of medical care services as they
progress through the year), which combined with persistence in information2 could explain the
results.
Years of schooling and income have expected positive effects on information. Minorities (black
and other non-white populations) tend to have less information than whites, all else equal. While
declining age could lead to loss in cognitive abilities making information more costly to acquire,
there could also be learning effects over time as beneficiaries navigate through the Medicare system
each year. The negative impact of age on information suggests that cognitive costs (not captured
through health status- functional limitations, number of chronic conditions or self-reported health)
are important. The exogenous identifying variables — having a personal computer at home and
receiving the Medicare and You Book — have a significant, positive impact on individuals’ infor-
mation levels.
2. Effect of information on insurance choice
The large magnitudes and significance of coefficients corresponding to the insurance plan cho-
sen last year in Table 7.2 provide evidence for the considerable amount of persistence that exists in
insurance selection. However, even after controlling for past choices, information (i.e., the number
of correct responses) has a significant effect on the choice of insurance plan. In particular, indi-
viduals with greater information about MA plans and PDPs are more likely to choose these plans.3
Beneficiaries who are more knowledgeable about the preventive care service coverage benefits of
Medicare are more likely to choose a combination of Original Medicare with PDP and some form
2The correct answers to the questions asked in the Beneficiary Needs and Knowledge Supplement do not change
considerably over the years, so information persistence is to be expected.
3We might expect that individuals could gain information about a product by ‘experiencing’ the product, thus
motivating the purchase of insurance alternatives which were either not chosen in the past or are not well understood
by the beneficiary (less information). However, the signs of the coefficients on lagged insurance and the information
variables do not seem to support this hypothesis.
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of supplemental insurance over an MA plan. Higher medical expenditures in the past have a pos-
itive impact on the probability of choosing supplemental insurance and individuals with chronic
conditions are likely to choose Prescription Drug Plans for drug coverage. Parameter estimates
also indicate advantageous selection in MA plans (i.e., individuals in better health who realize
lower medical expenditures are more likely to select Medicare Advantage Plans).
Medicaid eligibility has a positive significant impact on the probability of having an MA plan.
This may be due to mandated automatic enrollment in managed care plans in many states. The
probability of enrolling in a PDP is lower with Medicaid eligibility as the full Medicaid status
covers prescription drugs. Medicaid eligibility also reduces the probability of supplemental insur-
ance, in part, due to the comprehensive benefits associated with the combination of Medicare and
Medicaid. Another reason could be the eligibility criteria based on low income, which reduces the
chances of supplemental insurance purchase. The VA health care system also has provisions for
prescription drug coverage. As a result, beneficiaries who are eligible for VA health benefits are
less likely to be enrolled in PDPs and Medicare Advantage Plans. Access to employer sponsored
insurance increases the probability of enrollment in a Medicare Advantage Plan and a supplemental
insurance plan.
3. Effect of information on use of preventive care services
The first column of Table 7.3 shows parameter estimates of selected variables that explain the
decision to consume preventive care. While knowledge about Medicare Advantage Plans or Pre-
scription Drug Plans does not have a significant effect on the use of preventive medical services,
knowledge about coverage of these services has a significant, positive impact on the probability of
utilizing preventive care. Individuals with only Original Medicare (no PDP or supplemental insur-
ance) are considerably less likely to consume preventive care services. This finding is consistent
with the fact that Original Medicare is the default option for all beneficiaries, and does not require
any information acquisition. Beneficiaries are more likely to utilize preventive care as they age.
The number of chronic conditions has a positive impact on the probability of using preventive care
but usage declines with increase in functional limitations.
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Table 7.1: Parameter Estimates for Selected Variables Explaining Information
Selected Variables # correct MA # correct PDP # correct PREV
Medical Expenditure last period (/1000) −0.007 −0.002 0.003
(0.045) (0.003) (0.005)
No. of chronic conditions entering the period 0.024∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Moderately disabled −0.025∗ −0.008 −0.116∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.028)
Severely disabled 0.026 0.058∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.037)
Indicator for MA plan last period 0.473∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.071∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.026)
Indicator for PDP last period 0.095∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019)
Indicator for SUPP insurance last period −0.010 0.020 0.294∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.025)
Age −0.014∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Years of education 0.024∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Income (/1000) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Indicator for race black −0.151∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.2696∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.033)
Indicator for race other −0.159∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.043)
Have personal computer at home 0.225∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.059)
Received Medicare and You Book 0.111∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.036) (0.051)
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%. Other
explanatory variables include rest of the exogenous variables in Table 6.3, the identifying variables in Table 5.1, and,
parameters for unobserved heterogeneity. I also include higher order moments and interaction terms of exogenous
variables.
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Table 7.2: Parameter Estimates for Selected Variables Explaining Insurance Selection
Selected Variables MA Plan Part D Plan Supp. Plan
# correct MA responses 0.256∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
# correct PDP responses 0.032 0.252∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
# correct Preventive care responses −0.061∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Medical Expenditure last period (/1000) −0.033∗∗ −0.004 0.029∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
No. of chronic conditions entering the period −0.004 0.030∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.020)
Moderately disabled 0.088 0.043 −0.078
(0.083) (0.078) (0.073)
Severely disabled 0.016 0.072 0.080
(0.111) (0.113) (0.098)
Indicator for MA plan last period 5.328∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.072) (0.063)
Indicator for PDP last period 0.368∗∗∗ 5.139∗∗∗ −1.050∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.058) (0.054)
Indicator for SUPP insurance last period −0.668∗∗∗ −1.388∗∗∗ 4.670∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.077) (0.065)
Age −0.048∗∗∗ −0.010 0.047∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Years of education −0.012 −0.010 0.043∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.002)
Income (/1000) −0.006∗∗∗ −0.003 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Indicator for race black 0.133∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.098) (0.083)
Indicator for race other −0.110∗ 0.297∗∗ −0.233∗∗
(0.0124) (0.154) (0.120)
Eligibility for Medicaid 0.568∗∗∗ −1.610∗∗∗ −0.536∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.130) (0.079)
Eligibility for VA coverage −0.283∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.080) (0.070)
Eligibility for ESI 0.111∗∗∗ −0.440 1.14∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.253) (0.067)
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%. Other
explanatory variables include the exogenous variables in Table 6.3, the identifying variables in Table 5.1, and
parameters for unobserved heterogeneity. I also include higher order moments and interaction terms of exogenous
variables. Full regression equations also control for Medicaid, VA and ESI eligibility along with a variable for whether
the indvidual receives help on insurance decisions.
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4. Medical care services utilization and expenditures
The last three columns of Table 7.3 show parameter estimates of selected variables that explain
the different types medical care utilization. As discussed earlier, I include knowledge variables in
the estimation to allow information to have independent effects on medical care utilization apart
from its indirect effect through insurance and preventive care choice. Significance and magni-
tude of the coefficient of last year’s medical expenditure, even after controlling for health status,
indicates that there are certain persistence effects in medical care consumption. As expected, in-
dividuals in lower health status (moderately or severely disabled, having chronic conditions) and
those who experience a health shock consume more medical care. The signs of the coefficients
suggest that information, in general, has a positive impact on medical care utilization. However,
the effects on inpatient utilization are smaller and usually insignificant.4 This finding is consistent
with the largely, non-discretionary nature of inpatient services. While having supplemental insur-
ance increases utilization of all types of medical care, having a prescription drug plan is associated
with lower inpatient care utilization.
Medical expenditures (both total and out-of-pocket) are a function of medical care utilization,
prices (captured by the identifying Z variables in Table 5.1) and the insurance plan selected by the
individual. However, insurance plans are identified only up to a broad category in the data. For
example, while the researcher can observe if the beneficiary chose a PDP, she has no information
regarding whether the chosen PDP was the best/most efficient/lowest cost PDP in the set of Pre-
scription Drug Plans available to the beneficiary. This unobservable component of insurance choice
can be captured, in part, by the inclusion of information variables directly in the expenditure equa-
tions (More informed individuals are more likely to have chosen the best PDP.) While information
about insurance choices has either an insignificant or a positive effect on total expenditures, it has
4Note that consumption of preventive care services is included in outpatient and drug events. It is included as an
explanatory variable in utilization of inpatient services to allow for any independent effects of preventive care use(aside
from its effect through early detection of shocks).
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a significant negative impact on individuals’ out of pocket expenditures. Beneficiaries with Medi-
care Advantage plans realize lower total expenditures as well as lower out-of-pocket expenditures
where as holders of supplementary insurance policies experience higher expenditures.
Since the sample used in the estimation includes dual eligible individuals, the positive effect
of greater information in reducing out-of pocket expenditures may be suspect if Medicaid eligible
beneficiaries are also likely to be more informed. This is because dual eligibles may realize lower
out-of-pocket expenditures by simply having a more comprehensive coverage which they qualified
for (instead of actually choosing it). However, coefficients of the Medicaid eligibility dummy
variable in the equations for information are not significant indicates that the results, particularly
with respect to the relationship between information and out-of-pocket expenditures, are not driven
primarily by the inclusion of a special population like dual eligibles.
6.Functional Status Transitions
Table 7.5 displays the parameters of the estimated Grossman-style health production. Real-
ization of a health shock reduces the probability of having no functional limitations (the omitted
category). I also include interactions of health shocks with medical care consumption to exam-
ine the efficacy of medical care inputs in tempering the effect of a health shock.5 However, these
coefficients are largely insignificant and small in magnitude. Although the Medicare Current Ben-
eficiary Survey provides relatively detailed information on health conditions, it is difficult to form
an objective measure of the severity of a health shock from survey data alone. Medical care uti-
lization reflects, in part, this unobserved (to the researcher) severity of the health shock. Hence, it
is difficult to identify the productivity of medical care in combating health shocks. However, inter-
action terms of functional limitations at the beginning of the period with medical care utilization,
clearly show, that utilization of medical inputs increases the probability of transitioning into the
state with no functional limitations.
5Note that the information variables are not included as explanatory variables in the estimation of the health transi-
tion equations because the information considered in this research strictly pertains to individual’s knowledge regarding
their health insurance choice environment, and as such, it affects health transitions only through its indirect impact on
medical care utilization via its effect on insurance choice.
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Table 7.4: Parameter Estimates for Selected Variables Explaining Medical Care Expenditures
Selected Variables Inpatient Service Outpatient & Drug Out-of-pocket
expenditures (log) expenditures (log) expenditures (log)
Inpatient medical care use (/100) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
Outpatient and drug utilization(/100) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002)
No. of chronic conditions entering the period 0.024∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.013) (0.003) (0.005)
Moderately disabled −0.370∗∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.004
(0.048) (0.012) (0.019)
Severely disabled −0.756∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.061) (0.016) (0.025)
# correct MA responses 0.007 −0.001 −0.150∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.004) (0.006)
# correct PDP responses −0.004 0.006∗ −0.270∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.004) (0.006)
# correct Preventive care responses 0.014 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.010) (0.003) (0.004)
Indicator for MA plan −0.064∗ −0.207∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.012) (0.017)
Indicator for PDP −0.079∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.010) (0.015)
Indicator for SUPP insurance 0.258∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.012) (0.017)
Health Shock 0.449 0.108∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.010) (0.016)
Age −0.002 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.002) (0.003)
Years of education 0.019∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Income(/1000) 0.004∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Indicator for race black −0.061 −0.056∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.016) (0.024)
Indicator for race other −0.227∗∗ 0.002 −0.492∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.021) (0.031)
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% and *** indicates significance at 1%. Other explanatory
variables include the exogenous variables in Table 6.3, the identifying variables in Table 5.1, and parameters for unobserved
heterogeneity. I also include higher order moments and interaction terms of exogenous variables.
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7.2 Simulation Results
7.2.1 Simulation Details and Model Fit
The effect of information on insurance choice, medical care demand and health outcomes in
this dynamic model is best shown using simulation. The simulations quantify the long-run effect
of information by incorporating the dynamic effects of behavior in the current period on future
choices and health transitions.
The simulation procedure is straightforward. Given the initially observed characteristics of
the individual, I use the parameters of the estimated model to simulate the number of correct
answers for each information category, insurance choice, preventive care choice, health shocks and
demand for medical care for the entire sample of 17,813 individuals. The simulated health shocks
and medical care inputs together determine end-of-period health status and medical expenditures
(endogenous state variables), which are transferred to the next period and the subsequent behavior
and outcomes are again simulated using the updated state variables. This process is repeated for
five years.6 I replicate each individual multiple times allowing one draw from the permanent
unobserved heterogeneity distribution and draws every year from the time-varying distribution.7
The fit of the preferred model is demonstrated by comparing observed outcomes of the sample
with model predictions using estimated model parameters and observed exogenous explanatory
variables. Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6 shows how well the model (indicated by dashed line) fits the
observed number of correct responses in each information category (indicated by solid line) by
age. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 depict a comparison of observed and predicted probabilities of choosing
different insurance plans and medical expenditures. The model fits these outcomes reasonably
well, keeping in mind that the sample size gets relatively small at ages above 90.
6Simulated values are used for all endogenous dependent variables but the original values (from the data) are
retained for exogenous variables such as age, education, income etc. and for the identifying, Z variables.
7The objective is to simulate the impacts for a population whose exogenous characteristics are the same as the
sample used in the study and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is the estimated ex-ante distribution.
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7.2.2 Dynamic Effects of Greater Information
The policy question that I want to answer using simulations is: What happens to insurance
choices, medical expenditures and health outcomes over time if costs of acquiring/processing in-
formation are reduced? I compare two extreme scenarios — when information costs are so low
that all individuals in the model have ‘full information’ (i.e., they answer all questions correctly)
and the case when information costs are prohibitive such that individuals have ‘no information’
(i.e., they answer all the questions incorrectly). The simulation procedure is the same as described
above with one important exception. Information is not simulated and kept fixed (at ‘all answers
correct’ or ‘no answers correct’) for all time periods as part of each policy simulation. Results
from the simulations are summarized in Tables 7.6 and 7.7. The percentage of individuals choos-
ing Medicare Advantage Plans increases by 12.72 per cent when moved from a scenario of ‘no
information’ to ‘full information’. Similarly, a greater percentage of individuals supplement their
Original Medicare with a Prescription Drug Plan or some form of supplemental insurance as they
get more informed. The utilization of preventive care services increases by 6.17 per cent. Total
expenditures on both inpatient utilization and outpatient and drug utilization increases with greater
information. This effect comes from greater utilization of medical care services as individuals be-
come more informed. However, out-of-pocket expenditures incurred by beneficiaries fall by 8.50
per cent in spite of the greater utilization of medical services. These monetary gains seem to be
driven by more efficient insurance plan choices. The overall health of the sample does not show
any significant changes. The proportion of individuals with moderate and severe disability over
the five-year period remains the same under alternative information scenarios. A closer examina-
tion, however, reveals that the outcomes of the individuals with lower initial health status (either
moderately or severely disabled) improve considerably under full information. Of the 22 per cent
individuals who have some functional limitation at their first period of observation, 51.73 per cent
are able to transition to the no limitation state under full information. The corresponding number
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for ‘no information’ is 40.75 per cent.8 This positive impact of information on the ‘less healthy’
individuals is driven by its positive impact on medical care utilization which is an effective input
in the health production process of these individuals (Table 7.5). The greater impact on health
outcomes for the ‘less healthy’ individuals suggests that policy makers with limited resources of
increasing insurance literacy should target this subgroup of the elderly.
I also examine the dynamic marginal effects of information (i.e, increasing the number of
correct answers by one standard deviation from their simulated value). Results are qualitatively
similar to the full vs. no information simulations and are provided in Tables 7.8 and 7.9.
Table 7.6: Five Year Simulations of Insurance and Preventive Care Choices under Full and No
Information
Full Information No Information Percentage Change
Insurance Choice
Medicare Advantage 40.34 27.62 12.72 (2.38)
Prescription Drug Plan 66.17 50.29 15.88 (3.29)
Supplemental Insurance 65.84 63.46 2.38 (2.12)
Preventive Care Choice
Preventive Care 87.43 81.26 6.17 (1.80)
Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parantheses. Full Information: All individuals answer
all the questions correctly. No Information: All individuals answer all the questions incorrectly.
In the year 2011, the estimated number of Medicare beneficiaries in the United States was ap-
proximately 50 million. According to the simulation results in Table 7.9, the average reduction in
out-of-pocket expenditures per beneficiary when the information in each of the three categories is
increased by one standard deviation is 30 dollars thus resulting in aggregate consumer savings of
1.50 billion dollars. At the same time, there is an increase in total medical expenditures of 432
dollars per beneficiary as a result of the greater information; thereby, increasing total Medicare
spending by 21.60 billion dollars. Even after accounting for the consumer savings, there is an
aggregate increase in health care spending of 20.10 billion dollars. While evaluating the impact
8The overall impact on health outcomes for the entire population is much smaller than the impact on individuals
with functional limitations. However, this does not imply that the subgroup impact of information for the healthy
individuals is negative as the percentage of individuals with functional limitations is relatively small (22 per cent).
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Table 7.7: Five Year Simulations of Medical Expenditures and Health Outcomes under Full and
No Information
Full Information No Information Percentage Change
Medical care expenditures
Expenditures on inpatient services 9145.50 8934.42 2.30 (0.94)
Expenditures on outpatient and drug events 9967.87 9178.34 7.90 (2.17)
Total expenditures 19113.37 18112.76 5.24 (1.65)
Out-of-pocket expenditures 1916.53 2079.33 -8.50 (1.87)
Health outcomes
Not disabled 75.88 73.25 2.63 (1.20)
Moderately disabled 16.62 17.14 -0.52 (0.53)
Severely disabled 7.50 9.61 -2.11 (1.14)
Above average self-reported health 40.91 38.86 2.05 (1.84)
Health outcomes of the disabled (22%)
Not disabled 51.73 40.75 10.98 (0.56)
Moderately disabled 26.88 34.58 -7.70 (0.69)
Severely disabled 21.39 24.67 -3.28 (1.47)
Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parantheses. Full Information: All individuals answer all the questions correctly.
No Information: All individuals answer all the questions incorrectly.
of greater information, this increase in medical care spending has to be weighed against the im-
provement in health status of individuals with functional limitations. This positive impact can be
measured by the increase in the percentage of moderately and severely disabled individuals who
manage to transition into a ‘no functional limitation’ state. For a one standard deviation increase
in information, this percentage change is approximately 2 per cent.
7.3 Relating the Findings to the Existing Literature
The primary contribution of this research is to examine the impact of imperfect information
on insurance selection while allowing the plan choice to affect subsequent medical care utilization
and evolution of health outcomes. Results show that information affects insurance choice and,
in particular, more informed individuals are likely to choose ‘greater’ coverage (in the form of a
Medicare Advantage Plan or by supplementing FFS Medicare with a Part D plan or a supplemen-
tal insurance plan). With the higher coverage associated with greater information, medical care
utilization, particularly of the more discretionary types of care — preventive care, outpatient care,
and prescription drugs — increases. Overall, at the level of the population, there are no significant
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Table 7.8: Increasing Information Variables by One Standard Deviation, Each Period over Five
Years: Insurance and Preventive Care Choice
Simulated One Std. Dev. Increase Percentage Change
Insurance Choice
Medicare Advantage 36.86 40.34 3.48 (1.22)
Prescription Drug Plan 62.48 66.71 4.23 (1.86)
Supplemental Insurance 67.81 69.35 1.54 (1.37)
Preventive Care Choice
Preventive Care 86.37 87.81 1.44 (0.75)
Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parantheses.
health improvements but certain subgroups such as those who start in poor health realize gains in
terms of health. This result is very similar to the findings of the predominant literature that has
examined the relationship between insurance selection and medical care utilization such as The
Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al., 1987), and more recently, The Oregon Health
Insurance Experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2011). Both these studies randomize insurance coverage
and find that insured individuals are more likely to consume medical care but gains in health as a
result of the increased medical care utilization are confined to some sub-groups only.
With respect to the role of information frictions for individual out-of-pocket expenditures, this
research finds that greater information leads to lower out-of-pocket expenditures, even after con-
suming higher levels of medical care, thus providing evidence that consumers with more informa-
tion make relatively efficient plan choices. This result is also consistent with the huge strand of
literature on information frictions such as Lin and Wildenbeest (2013); Ho et al. (2015), which find
substantial gains for consumers when information frictions are removed.
7.4 Discussion of Equilibrium Effects
The simulation experiments above show that individuals acquiring more information incur
lower out-of-pocket expenditures and improved health outcomes under certain conditions. These
findings suggest that policies that reduce information frictions will enhance consumer welfare.
However, this research does not model the supply side of the health insurance market (i.e., the
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Table 7.9: Increasing Information Variables by One Standard Deviation, Each Period over Five
Years: Medical Expenditures and Health Outcomes
Simulated One Std. Dev. Increase Percentage Change
Medical care expenditures
Expenditures on inpatient services 9178.00 9271.00 1.03 (0.72)
Expenditures on outpatient and drug events 9880.34 10219.27 3.43 (1.69)
Total expenditures 19058.34 19490.27 2.26 (1.82)
Out-of-pocket expenditures 2140.79 2110.61 -1.43 (0.85)
Health outcomes
Not disabled 70.81 69.33 1.48 (1.88)
Moderately disabled 18.02 18.67 -0.65 (1.24)
Severely disabled 11.17 12 0.83 (1.19)
Above average self-reported health 37.16 38.87 1.71 (0.73)
Health outcomes of the disabled (22%)
Not disabled 49.25 51.24 1.99 (0.76)
Moderately disabled 27.95 26.14 -1.81 (1.05)
Severely disabled 22.8 22.62 -0.18 (1.18)
Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parantheses.
effect of reducing information frictions on insurer pricing).9 In this section, I draw upon existing
literature to discuss the possible equilibrium effects of an increase in information in the population.
Compared to the market for private health insurance, Medicare is highly regulated even with
respect to Medicare Advantage and Prescription Drug Plans, which are offered through private
insurers, thus limiting the role of insurer practices for the effects of greater information among
the consumers. In the market for Medigap, for example, (which are Medicare supplemental in-
surance plans), Lin and Wildenbeest (2013) find evidence for substantial consumer search costs
and potential for consumer welfare through reduction in premiums when search costs are reduced.
When consumer inattention is removed in the market for Prescription Drug Plans, Ho et al. (2015)
find that effective insurer competition reduces premiums. The results from these empirical studies
would suggest that the benefits of greater information, in terms of lower out of pocket expenditures,
found in this research are a lower bound on the actual increase in consumer welfare. As consumers
9Modeling the supply side will make this complicated model of decision-making intractable. Moreover, data on
insurer pricing is not available
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become more informed and capable of making optimal decisions, premiums are expected to de-
crease too, resulting in more savings for the consumer.
However, just like other insurance markets, the market for health insurance also faces chal-
lenges like adverse selection and moral hazard. Imperfect information and inattention among con-
sumers could be mitigating these problems to some extent. For example, consumers who are not
aware of the characteristics of their insurance plans (such as deductibles) may not be responsive
to the decrease in marginal prices caused by reaching the plan deductible thus reducing ex-post
moral hazard. Some recent studies have corroborated this phenomenon. Handel (2013) shows
that improved individual-level choices (due to reduced switching costs) substantially exacerbate
adverse selection. When insurers take into account this increased adverse selection, premiums rise
and there is an overall reduction in welfare. Handel (2013) uses data on insurance plans offered at
a large firm in the US. Thus, the ultimate equilibrium impact of increased information among the
elderly would depend on the extent of moral hazard and adverse selection in the Medicare health
insurance market and the sensitivity of these phenomenon to consumer information.
While the equilibrium effects of information on out-of-pocket expenditures may be debatable,
the positive effects on long-term health outcomes of the elderly through improved medical care
choices should not be affected by the incorporation of insurer behavior in the model.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This research constructs measures of individuals’ information about their coverage choices
using a previously unexploited survey component of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey,
conducted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and examines the dynamic im-
pact of imperfect information on insurance selection, medical care utilization, expenditure and
health outcomes of the elderly by jointly estimating a set of theoretically derived dynamic demand
and production functions. Several important, policy relevant findings come out of this analysis.
First, informed individuals are more likely to choose Medicare Advantage Plans or supplement
traditional fee-for-service Medicare with Prescription Drug Plans or some form of supplemental
insurance. Second, simulation results suggest that greater information has welfare improving ef-
fects on the elderly population in terms of lower out-of-pocket expenditures and better long-term
health outcomes for those with functional limitations. Third, while individuals benefit, total ex-
penditures rise as the informed elderly consume more medical services including preventive care
services than their less informed counterparts. These effects may be different with simulation over
a longer time horizon when some health benefits could translate into cost savings for Medicare.
The simulation experiments also show that individuals in poor health status (having some func-
tional limitations) realize an improvement in their health outcomes in addition to lower out-of-
pocket expenditures. This finding suggests that policy makers should target limited resources for
improving insurance literacy towards the subgroup of elderly with functional limitations.
The present analysis does not incorporate equilibrium effects of changes in insurer pricing
strategies as individuals gain more information. Theoretical and empirical literature on infor-
mation frictions shows that insurer mark-ups usually go down as frictions are removed from the
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market and consumers are able to make better decisions implying that the benefits of information
estimated from this study, particularly, in terms of individual out-of-pocket savings, are a lower
bound on the actual welfare effects of information. However, greater information and improved
individual choices could also exacerbate phenomenon like adverse selection in health insurance
markets leading to higher long-term prices (Handel, 2013).
By examining the determinants of imperfect information this research also helps identify some
instruments through which policy makers could affect the information levels of Medicare beneficia-
ries. For example, even controlling for demographics such as education and income, information
shifters such as ‘having a personal computer at home’ or ‘receiving the Medicare and You book’
have a strong, positive impact on the measure of individual information. These results suggest that
the elderly are responsive to policies (such as public information campaigns, one-to-one counsel-
ing, initiatives to increase the outreach of the elderly to the internet) which are aimed at increasing
their insurance literacy.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX
A.1
The theoretical model described below captures the optimization problem of a rational agent
who acquires costly information about the insurance plans available to her followed by the decision
to enroll in a specific insurance plan and subsequent decision to purchase medical care in order to
maximize the value of her lifetime utility in an environment where health is stochastic. Using this
model, I derive a value function for information (equation 4.1 in Chapter 4) which is then used to
specify an estimation equation.
Entering each period t, an individual agent knows her health condition, Ht, and her own de-
mographic characteristics (e.g., education, income etc.), Xt. She may not know perfectly about
the choice environment she is facing with regard to health insurance. She knows that the set of
insurance alternatives include the 8 options (listed in Table 3.1).Let I be the set of insurance plans
available to her. An insurance plan It ∈ I has price features PIt ≡ (P It , P FIt , PMIt ), where F
denotes preventive care services (e.g., mammograms, PSA tests, flu shots, routine eye check ups,
etc.)1 andM represents the medical care services. An insurance plan has an upfront cost (premium)
captured by P It . P
FI
t and P
MI
t denote the effective price of the medical care services covered by
the insurance plan I . This effective price is determined by a plan’s features including coverage,
deductible, coinsurance, out of pocket maximum etc.2 The agent does not perfectly know PIt and
acquiring or processing this information is costly.
Let ωt ∈ Ω denote an underlying state at time t that determines the prices Pt(ωt). The agent
has prior belief pit ∈ ∆(Ω) over the state. Let ξt ∈ Ξ denote the signal received by the individual
about the underlying state, where Ξ is a finite realization space, and p(ξt|ωt) denote the probability
1These services do not include non-medical preventive care such as exercise, nutrition, relaxation etc.
2The effective price is defined very broadly- for example, one characteristic of an insurance plan could be the
reputation of the seller. Ultimately, individuals are more likely to buy an insurance plan from an established seller
because they expect that the effective price (taking into account the uncertainty of getting defrauded, payment delays
etc.) is lower
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of receiving signal ξt given that the state is ωt. Then {p(.|ω)} (where ‘.’ represents all possible ξt)
is the probability distribution of signals given that ω is the underlying state. The set of distributions
(or family of distributions), {p(.|ω)}ω∈Ω, captures the probability of each ξt ∈ Ξ given any ωt ∈ Ω.
The set, {p(.|ω)}ω∈Ω, along with the signal space, Ξ, tells us everything we need to know about
the probabilities of signal realizations and is referred to as the signal structure, Ξp.
For simplicity, we assume that Ω = Ξ = {0, 1}|Q|, for some finite |Q|. Then, assuming that
the probability of signal realizations for each of (ω1, ω2, . . . , ω|Q|) are independent of each other
and do not depend on the value of the actual state (i.e., do no depend on whether ωk is 0 or 1), the
signal structure can be represented by p ≡ (p1, p2, . . . p|Q|), where pkt := p(ξkt = ωkt|ωkt). Thus,
pkt is the probability that the signal reveals the kth component of underlying state correctly. I will
call this p the precision of the signals. The agent optimally chooses this pt and incurs an acquiring
and processing cost κ(pt) to do so.
The updated belief upon receiving signal ξt is
pi′(ωt|ξt) = pit(ωt)p(ξt|ωt)∑
ω′t
pit(ω′t)p(ξt|ω′t)
The posterior beliefs must be Bayes consistent, i.e.,
∑
ξt
p′(ξt)pi′(ωt|ξi) = pit(ωt)
Given this posterior belief, the agent’s perception of the price environment is denoted by Pst(ξt),
which is distribution overPt(ωt). Thus, by choosing a signal structure, the agent receives signal ξt
with probability p′(ξt) =
∑
ωt
pit(ωt)p(ξt|ωt) and given the signal ξt, her price perception isPst(ξt).
Timeline: The agent enters time t with state variablesHt, Xt, mt−1 and belief pit. We include
mt−1 as a state variable because there may be persistent effects in the use of medical care. The
agent goes through the following decision making steps (depicted in the timeline in Figure 1).
1. At the beginning of time t, the agent chooses precision, pt ∈ P ≡ [0, 1].
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2. The agent receives a particular realization ξt from her chosen signal structure. Based on this
realization and her prior, pit, she forms her perception PIst , about actual price features P
I
t .
3. Subsequently, the agent evaluates insurance alternative, I ∈ I based on her health, Ht,
individual characteristics, past medical care, mt−1, Xt, perception Pst ≡ (PIst )I∈I
4. After selecting an insurance plan, she decides whether or not to consume preventive care
ft ∈ Ft.
Figure A.1: Timing of the Model
5. After the preventive care decision, uncertain health shocks within the period are realized,
St ∈ St.
6. Depending on the shock realized and conditional on the other previous decisions (It and ft),
the individual chooses her medical care consumption, mt.
7. Health evolves, such that health entering the next period,Ht+1, is a function of current health,
Ht, the health shock, St, and medical care inputs (ft,mt).
8. The updated belief pit+1 = pi′t(ξt).
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Within each period, the consumer derives utility from consumption (Ct) and health (Ht). We
abstract from the labor-leisure decision because most respondents are above age 65. Per period
utility is described by:
Ut = U(Ct, Ht)
The individual allocates income between a composite consumption good, insurance, and medical
care inputs. The budget constraint of the individual is represented by:
Yt = Ct +P
I
t .(It, ft,mt)
where Yt is income and Ct is a composite consumption good with price normalized to 1. P It is the
price of insurance of plan I and other Pt variables (P FIt , P
MI
t ) denote the actual effective price of
medical services when insurance plan It is chosen in period t.
Health in next period is determined by health entering the period, health shocks, medical care
inputs chosen in the period and demographic variables. If we discretize health into h = 1, . . . H
categories, then:
Pr(Ht+1 = h) = f
h(Ht, Xt, ft, St,mt), h = 1, ..., H
The probability of health shocks (St) is a function of the state variables entering period t and the
preventive care chosen in period t
Pr(St = 1) = g
S(Ht, Xt, Ft)
This individual is observed for a finite, T, periods in the data. The objective of the individual is to
choose the precision with which to know the price environment, type of insurance coverage and
the levels of medical care inputs (preventive and curative) that maximize her lifetime utility. The
decision to acquire information, the health insurance choice, and the use of preventive care services
is made prior to the realization of the health shock, and the choice of curative medical inputs is
made after the realization of the shock.
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We can represent the individual’s decision making problem using a Bellman equation. We
begin with the last decision of the period, the curative medical care decision. The perceived value
of lifetime utility of choosing mt ∈ Mt at time t, conditional on the choice of insurance (It), the
preventive care utilization (Ft), the health shock (St) and the preference error term (uMmt) for each
t<T is
V Mmt (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,P
s
t(ξt), u
M
mt|pt, It, Ft, St) =
Epi′(ωt|ξt)U(Yt − PtI(ωt)It − PtFI(ωt)Ft − PtmI(ωt)mt, Ht) + uMmt
+ β(
H∑
h=1
Pr(Ht+1 = h|Ht, Xt, Ft, St,mt)Vt+1(Ht+1, Xt+1,mt, pit+1) (A.1)
and for t=T
V Mmt (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,P
s
t(ξt), u
M
mt|pt, It, Ft, St) =
Epi′(ωt|ξt)U(Yt − PtI(ωt)It − PtFI(ωt)Ft − PtmI(ωt)mt, Ht) + uMmt
+ β(
H∑
h=1
Pr(Ht+1 = h|Ht, Xt, Ft, St,mt)Qt+1(Ht+1, Xt+1,mt, pit+1) (A.2)
where QT+1 is the value of expected discounted future utility at the end of year T which is approx-
imated by a closing function, i.e., I assume that this value is determined by a non-stochastic (i.e.,
no error term) linear function of the state variables entering the first period after T, medical care
consumed in T, and a vector of parameters.
Note that agents makes their choice based on their perception Pst ,
3 but after the health choices
have been made the actual cost depends on the actual prices. I assume actual consumption is the
residual budget, i.e. the agent cannot make adjustment to his health consumption further to meet
3I do not assume that once an insurance plan is chosen, all its characteristics are automatically revealed to the
individual
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his budget.4 Due to imperfect information, the agent may be mistaken about the value of this
residual budget. Thus, she makes an optimization error.
Having defined V Mmt (Ht, Xt,mt−1pit,P
s
t(ξt), u
M
mt|pt, It, Ft, St), we can now consider the pre-
ventive care decision. At the time of preventive care selection, St is not known. The value of each
preventive care alternative f , unconditional on curative care decision but conditional on choice of
insurance and preventive care decision is given by
V Fft (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,P
s
t(ξt), u
F
ft|pt, It) =
S∑
s=1
P (St = s)EuMt [maxm
V Mmt (Ht, Xt,mt−1pit,P
s
t(ξt), u
M
mt|pt, It, Ft, St)] + uFft (A.3)
The maximal expected lifetime utility unconditional on preventive care choice but conditional on
insurance choice is
V IIt(Ht, Xt,mt−1pit,P
s
t (ξt), u
I
It|pt) = EuFt [maxf V
F
ft (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,P
s
t (ξt), u
F
ft|pt, It)] + uIIt
(A.4)
Note that the value function in equation A.4 is still conditional on the selected precision of
information, pt. The value of a choice of p is
V Ppt (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit) = EuIt
[
max
I
V IIt(Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,P
s
t(ξt), u
I
It|pt)
]
(A.5)
Finally, given the cost of pt, κ(pt), the value function right at the beginning of time t and before
making any choices is
Vt(Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit) :=
[
maxptEp′(ξt)V
p
t (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,P
s
t(ξt))− κ(pt)
]
(A.6)
To understand the value of information, notice that under complete information (i.e. when
4See Gabaix, 2014Gabaix (2011) for sparse maximization when agents make income adjustment in case they fail
to meet budget. Another way to avoid this income adjustment will be to assume quasi linear preference.
62
pt = 1), the individual will choose her insurance plan according to φc : Ω→ I, where
φc(ωt, .) := arg max
I∈I
V IIt(Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,Pt(ωt), u
I
It|1)
Recall that
V 1t (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,Pt(ωt)) = EuIt maxI∈I
V IIt(Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,Pt(ωt), u
I
It|1)
Now suppose the agents do not have full information. Let φc(ω) denote the right choice and
φ′c(ω) denote the wrong choice when state is ω. The agent chooses a precision pt < 1. Based on
the signal realization, she makes her choice φ : Ξ→ I, where
φ(ξt|pt, .) := arg max
I∈I
V Iit (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,P
s
t(ξt), u
I
It|pt, It) (A.7)
Definition 1 Given an underlying state ω , and signal realization ξ, the agent makes a Mistake if
φ(ξ|p, .) 6= φc(ω, .)
Let us define M(ω|p) := {ξ : φ(ξ|p) 6= φc(ω)} as the set of signal realizations for which
the individual would have made a mistake, had the state been ω. Define the complementary set as
M′(ω|p). Consider any ξ ∈M(ω|p), the individual chooses φ(ξ|p) 6= φc(ω). Thus, had the actual
underlying state been ω the agent would have a welfare loss defined by
V 1t (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,Pt(ωt))− V pt (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,Pst(ξt))
Therefore, given signal Ξpt , prior pit and Ht, Xt, the total utility loss at state ω is
L(ω|Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit, pt) =
∑
ξ∈M(ω|p)
[
V 1t (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,Pt(ωt))− V pt (Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit,Pst(ξt))
]
p(ξt|ωt)
(A.8)
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Therefore, the total loss from choosing pt < 1 is
L(Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit, pt) =
∑
ω∈Ω
L(ω|Ht, Xt,mt−1, pit, pt)pit(ω) (A.9)
The individual chooses p to minimize the value of this loss plus the cost κ(p) which is equiva-
lent to maximizing the RHS in equation A.5.
A.2
The Beneficiary Needs and Knowledge supplement of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Sur-
vey (MCBS) reports respondents’ knowledge about their insurance choice set through a series of
questions which allow for ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ responses (listed below). I categorize the
questions into three categories: questions related to Medicare Advantage Plans (QMA), questions
related to Prescription Drug Plans (QPDP ) and questions related to coverage of preventive care ser-
vices through Medicare (QPREV ).5 There is a correct answer to each of these questions forming a
profile of correct answers (analogous to the underlying state of the world Ω = Ξ = {0, 1}|Q| in the
theoretical model described in section A1 of the Appendix). The responses given by the beneficia-
ries to these questions form their perceptions about the effective price (analogous toPst ≡ (PIst )I∈I
in the theoretical model) faced by them with respect to each of the insurance options. For example,
consider the first question - ‘Do Medicare Advantage plans usually cover more services?’- The cor-
rect response to this question is ‘yes’. The beneficiary who knows gives the response ‘yes’ to this
question would realize (correctly) that the effective price of coverage through Medicare Advantage
plans based on this question is lower, ceteris paribus.
QMA =

Do Medicare Advantage plans usually cover more services?
If the Medicare HMO quits, Medicare will be covered by FFS?
Can Medicare HMO raise fees/change benefits each year?
5The supplement has additional questions. The questions listed here are asked every year allowing us to construct
a consistent measure of information through the years.
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QPDP =

Is limited income and resources assistance available for PDP?
Are out of pocket costs are the same for all drug plan?
Do all drug plans cover the same list of drugs?
QMPREV =

Does Medicare cover an annual mammogram for women?
Does Medicare cover an annual PSA test for men?
Does Medicare cover a routine dental exam?
Does Medicare cover annual flu shot?
Does Medicare cover colon cancer screening?
Does Medicare cover cardiovascular screening?
Does Medicare cover routine eye exam?
Does Medicare cover diabetes screening?
As the econometrician, I do not directly observe the value of the precision chosen by the in-
dividual in the data. However, I observe the beneficiaries’ responses to the above questions and
I know the actual correct answers to these question in each time period. Based on these, I form
the ‘number of correct responses’ for each individual in each time period which serve as a proxy
for the value of p.6 From now on, I will use the terms ‘precision’, ‘information’ and ‘number of
correct responses’ interchangeably.
A.3
Data on the endogenous and exogenous variables in the first year when each individual is
observed in the sample is used to get parameter estimates for initial condition equations specified
below. I estimate seven initial condition equations7 explaining, the functional status, the number
6It is intuitive to think of the precision choice as the choice of ‘effort’ exerted by the individual in collecting
information and the actual number of correct responses given by the individual as a function of that effort as well as
other factors like cognitive ability. However, the only distinction between the two is in terms of unobservables (like
cognitive ability) which I control for by modeling the unobserved heterogeneity.
7Initial conditions are are estimated for each endogenous state variable and initially observed health insurance
choice.
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of chronic conditions, the self-reported health, three equations for the choice of insurance plan and
the end of period total medical expenditure of the individual.
The probability of observing the choice of a MA/PDP/Supplemental Insurance plan in the
initial period is given by:
ln
[
Pr(Ij0 = 1)
Pr(Ij0 = 0)
]
= γ10j + γ
1
1jXt + γ
1
2jZ
I
0 + γ
1
3jZ
M
0 + γ
1
4jZ
H
0 + γ
1
5jt+ γ
1
6jt
2 + µjI0 (A.10)
where j= MA, PDP, SUPP
The initial number of severity adjusted chronic conditions is modeled as:
R0 = γ
2
0 + γ
2
1Xt + γ
2
2Z
H
0 + γ
2
6t+ γ
2
7t
2 + µR0 (A.11)
Log use of total medical care expenditures in the first period of observation are modeled as:
E0 = γ
3
0 +γ
3
1Xt+γ
3
2I
MA
0 +γ
3
3I
PDP
0 +γ
3
4I
SUPP
0 +γ
3
5Z
M
0 +γ
3
6Z
H
0 +γ
3
7R0 +γ
3
8t+γ
3
9t
2 +µE0 (A.12)
The probability of initially observed functional status is
ln
[
Pr(Lt+1 = a)
Pr(Lt+1 = 0)
]
= γ40a + γ
4
1aXt + γ
4
2aE0 + γ
4
3aZ
H
0 + µ
aH
0 (A.13)
where a=(1,2), and the initial self-reported health is given by the following estimation equation
G0 = γ
5
0 + γ
5
1Xt + γ
5
2Z
H
0 + γ
5
6t+ γ
2
7t
2 + µG0 (A.14)
ZH0 includes height of the individual which proxies for health during childhood and the median
air quality index of her area of residence. Time varying heterogeneity does not enter the equa-
tion for the initial state variables because these variables summarize the history of behavior and
outcomes from all periods prior to inclusion in the survey sample.
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A.4
The likelihood function is:
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